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Abstract 
Development of a Theory-based, Miranda Rights Educational Curriculum: Are there 
Cognitive Developmental Limitations to Legal Learning? 
Martha Kirkland Strachan 
Naomi Sevin Goldstein 
 
 
 
Despite the extension of the Miranda warnings to juvenile suspects following 
the Supreme Court decision in In re Gault (1967), research suggests that adolescents 
may fail to benefit from their legal rights. Specifically, younger adolescents (i.e., 
under the age of 15) tend to: (a) waive the rights to silence and legal counsel at 
greater rates than adults (Grisso &  Pomicter, 1977); (b) lack basic comprehension of 
the Miranda rights (e.g., Grisso, 1981); (c) misperceive the significance and function 
of the Miranda rights (e.g., Grisso, 1981); and (d) lack the developmental capacities 
to make decisions about legal rights (Grisso et al., 2003).  
The purpose of the proposed study was to design, implement, and evaluate a 
theory-based, Miranda rights educational curriculum for youth, ages 10 through 16. 
Integrating research from the fields of developmental, educational, and forensic 
psychology, we argued that the development of legal reasoning involves both 
quantitative changes in the individual’s repertoire of legal facts and qualitative 
changes in how the individual values rights. We hypothesized that a rights-based 
education program, based on the principles of Posner, Stike, Hewson, and Gertzog’s 
(1982) theory of conceptual change, could facilitate advancements in adolescents’ 
capacities to reason about legal rights. Furthermore, we hypothesized that changes in 
youths’ comprehension of and capacity to reason about the Miranda warnings would 
improve differentially across age groups. We implemented the curriculum for 
vii  
 
 
students from grades 5 through 10 at a college preparatory school in the Mid-Atlantic 
region. We assessed 64 students’ comprehension and appreciation of the Miranda 
rights and legal decision-making skills prior to and following the curriculum. Results 
indicated that the curriculum improved participants’ comprehension and appreciation 
of Miranda rights. However, participants’ rights-relevant, judgment-based abilities 
such as the ability to identify long range future consequences to waiver/assertion 
decisions, did not improve. Robust patterns for age emerged; although 10 to 12 year 
olds displayed the greatest improvements in Miranda comprehension and 
appreciation, they continued to score below 13 and 14 year olds and 15 and 16 year 
olds on most measures. Results are discussed in relation to conceptual change theory 
and previous research.  
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Introduction 
 In re Gault (1967) 
In Miranda v Arizona (1966), the Supreme Court ruled that any statement 
stemming from the custodial interrogation of a criminal suspect would be 
inadmissible unless the police provided the suspect with four warnings: (a) the right 
to remain silent, (b) the intent to use the suspect’s statement against the suspect in 
court, (c) the right to an attorney during questioning, and (d) the right to a court 
appointed attorney for indigent suspects. The Court further ruled that a suspect’s 
waiver to these rights is only valid if offered “knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily.” 
 States extended the provision of these warnings to juvenile suspects at the 
time of arrest following the Supreme Court decision In re Gault (1967). Prior to 
Gault, the juvenile court functioned with little Constitutional oversight. The role of 
the juvenile court was to act as a “benign parent” on “behalf of the child” (Steinberg 
& Schwartz, 2000, p. 12). Thus, progressive reformers characterized juvenile 
proceedings as “civil,” rather than “criminal,” and argued that juvenile sentences 
should “rehabilitate,” rather than “penalize” the youthful offender (Feld, 2000, p. 
107). As such, courts considered due process protections, including the rights to 
silence and legal counsel, unnecessary.    
 The Gault Court critically examined the traditional arguments for denying 
these protections to juvenile defendants. The Court reasoned that the civil 
characterization of juvenile proceedings had neither served to reduce crime nor to 
rehabilitate youthful offenders.  On the contrary, far from achieving their 
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rehabilitative intention, juvenile sentences amounted to “the deprivation of liberty” 
which the Court equated to “incarceration against one’s will,” whether characterized 
as “civil” or “criminal.” Furthermore, according to the Court, the civil 
characterization of juvenile proceedings did not justify the absence of procedural 
safeguards. Indeed, describing interrogations as “inherently coercive” and 
“intimidating,” the court reasoned that these safeguards were necessary to ensure that 
confessions were “reasonably trustworthy.” The Court asserted that the rights to 
silence and counsel served to maintain the balance between the criminal defendant 
and the state and reasoned that a criminal suspect, whether a child or an adult should 
be given the power to decide whether to assist the state in securing his conviction.  
Youth Fail to Receive the Benefits of their Legal Rights 
In rhetoric, the Gault decision suggested that defense attorneys and court 
officials would rigorously uphold and implement due process in juvenile proceedings. 
In practice, nearly forty years post-Gault, juvenile defendants continue to fail to 
receive the benefits of their legal rights. Grisso and Pomicter (1977) found that nearly 
90% of juvenile defendants waived the rights to silence and counsel during police 
interrogations. Clinical researchers (e.g., Grisso, 2000) and legal scholars (e.g., Feld, 
2000) have hypothesized that adolescents’ diminished legal reasoning capacities and 
inadequate sanctioning of juveniles’ rights contribute to these high waiver rates.  
Diminished Capacities 
 Research suggests that adolescents may lack the capacities necessary to make 
informed decisions about their legal rights. Briefly, younger adolescents (e.g., under 
the age of 15) tend to: (a) lack basic comprehension of the Miranda warnings (Grisso, 
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1981; Abramovitch & Peterson-Badali, 1995; Abramovitch, Higgins, & Biss, 1993); 
(b) misperceive the significance and function of the Miranda warnings (Grisso, 1981; 
Abramovitch, & Peterson-Badali, 1995; Abramovitch, Higgins, & Biss, 1993); (c) 
characterize rights as contingencies, rather than as entitlements (Grisso 1981; Wall & 
Furlong, 1985); (d) be more suggestible, and thus, more vulnerable to police 
interrogation practices than are adults (Gudjonsson & Singh,1984a; Gudjonsson & 
Singh, 1984b; Kassin & Kiechel, 1996); (e) misperceive the role of the defense 
attorney in interrogation contexts (Buss, 2000); and (f) lack the developmental 
capacities to make decisions about legal rights (Grisso et al., 2003; Cauffman & 
Steinberg, 2000).   
 Adequacy of Protections  
 Although the Supreme Court established the Miranda requirements as the 
minimum standard for the protection of juveniles’ rights, the Court also recognized 
that youth may be particularly vulnerable to police interrogation practices. Thus, 
although the Court permitted juvenile defendants to waive their rights, it required that 
judges carefully scrutinize juveniles’ waivers to ensure that waivers conformed to the 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary standard (Grisso, 2003). 
Presently, the majority of jurisdictions apply the totality of circumstances 
approach to determining the validity of a juvenile’s Miranda waiver (Grisso, 2003). 
This approach requires judicial discretionary determination based on the individual 
circumstances of a case. Although consideration of a youth’s age, level of education, 
and intellectual ability are relevant to these judicial decisions, no case law suggests 
how courts “should systematically evaluate the impact of the youth’s developmental 
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status on his ability to make a valid waiver” (Grisso, 1981, p. 117). Thus, legal 
scholars (e.g., Feld, 2000; Shepard, 2000) and developmental psychologists (e.g., 
Grisso, 1981; Steinberg & Schwartz, 2000) have criticized this approach, citing that 
courts typically exercise wide discretion when determining the validity of a juvenile 
defendant’s waiver.    
Recognizing that the totality approach may not provide adequate protection of 
juveniles’ rights, some states require that juvenile defendants consult with parents or 
guardians prior to waiving their rights.  Under this “per se” approach, juvenile 
defendants’ waivers are codified as “invalid” if the waiver is made in the absence of 
an “interested adult.” Although, in theory, consultation with a parent or guardian 
should compensate for the adolescent’s cognitive and developmental vulnerabilities, 
research suggests that parents rarely fulfill this intended role. Grisso and Ring (1979) 
found that parents often said nothing to their children during interrogations; when 
parents did offer advice, they tended to assume “authoritative” roles in front of police 
officers, encouraging their children to cooperate with the police. 
 Furthermore, some research suggests that court officials may actually 
encourage juvenile defendants to waive their rights (e.g., Lefstein, Stapleton, & 
Teitelbaum, 1969; Feld, 1993). Feld (1993) observed that judges often persuaded 
juvenile defendants to waive their rights in order to “ease the court’s administrative 
burden” (as cited in National Juvenile Defender Center, 1995, p. 22).  He observed 
that judges often provided juvenile defendants with “cursory” and “misleading” 
explanations of the purpose and significance of legal defense. Feld further noted that 
judges tended to minimize the significance of waiving these Miranda rights, often 
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implying to adolescent defendants that the “waiver litany” constituted nothing more 
than a “meaningless technicality” (as cited in National Juvenile Defender Center, 
1995, p. 22). 
Initiatives to Safeguard Juveniles’ Rights 
Although initiatives to safeguard adolescents’ legal rights often target 
systemic risk factors (e.g., increasing juveniles’ access to legal counsel), some 
researchers have highlighted the importance of developing and empirically evaluating 
interventions that target individual risk factors (e.g., deficits in comprehension of 
legal rights). Woolard and Repucci (2000) argued that intervention studies provide a 
“rigorous method” for identifying “risks and/or contributors to [legal] incompetence” 
(p. 182). The authors reasoned: 
If a variable risk factor (that is, a risk factor able to be changed) in the individual is 
associated with varying degrees of competence or participation effectiveness, then it 
should be possible to design interventions that change this factor and evaluate its 
impact… Theory based interventions that target risks for reduced competence located in 
the individual… will provide a strong test of juvenile capacities for competence and 
participation. (p. 182) 
Are the deficits that compromise adolescents’ legal decision-making 
capacities “variable” risk factors? Could an instructional intervention designed to 
teach adolescents the content, significance, and functions of the Miranda warnings 
mitigate these risk factors?  
Proposal Overview 
The aim of the current project is to design, implement, and evaluate a Miranda 
Rights Educational Curriculum for youth, ages 10 through 15. Kazdin’s (1997) 
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“Model for Developing Effective Treatments” provided the rubric for the 
development of this curriculum. Based on the first three steps of the model, I have 
organized this proposal into three sections: (1) Conceptualization of the Dysfunction, 
(2) Conceptualization of Treatment, and (3) Specification of Treatment. 
Part I: Conceptualization of the Dysfunction 
 According to Kazdin (1997), when developing interventions, researchers 
must first “conceptualize the dysfunction.” More specifically, researchers must 
identify potentially mutable risk factors that contribute to the onset, development, and 
maintenance of a specific dysfunction. These deficits should become the targets for 
the intervention program. 
In Part I, I identify the risk factors that contribute to adolescents’ diminished 
capacity to reason about their legal rights. First, I review the limitations of using the 
informed consent standard to define the scope of capacities/abilities that are relevant 
to adolescents’ legal decisions. Second, I use the “judgment framework” (Cauffman 
& Steinberg, 1995; Cauffman & Steinberg, 2000; Scott, Repucci, & Woolard, 1995) 
to “conceptualize” adolescents’ diminished legal reasoning capacity.  Third, I review 
research suggesting that adolescents manifest deficits in each of the 
capacities/abilities specified by the judgment framework. Finally, I consider whether 
these deficits are appropriate targets for an instructional intervention.  
Part II: Conceptualization of Treatment 
 According to Kazdin (1997), the question guiding treatment 
conceptualization is, “how does this treatment achieve change?” (p. 118). The author 
observed that the strong emphasis on demonstrating the efficacy of an intervention 
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often has overshadowed the role of psychological theory in the development and 
evaluation of the intervention. As such, Kazdin (1997) argued that only “limited” 
conclusions could be reached regarding the specific mechanisms of change 
responsible for the therapeutic gains (p. 114).  Thus, Kazdin (1997) urged researchers 
to base their interventions on well-developed, comprehensive theoretical models. 
In Part II, I use Posner, Strike, Hewson, and Gertzog’s (1982) theory of 
conceptual change to “conceptualize” the Miranda Rights Educational Curriculum. I 
address the questions of when and how adolescents develop legal reasoning skills. 
First, I review research that suggests that critical advances in the capacity for legal 
reasoning occur during adolescence. Second, I present Legal Development Theory 
(Tapp & Kohlberg, 1977), a theory of legal reasoning based on Piaget’s cognitive 
developmental paradigm and Kohlberg’s theory of moral reasoning. Third, consistent 
with the cognitive developmental paradigm, I argue that legal development requires 
quantitative change (an increase in factual understanding of the law and legal 
processes) and qualitative change (a reconfiguration of the system of knowledge, 
values, and heuristics that the individual uses to approach legal dilemmas). Fourth, I 
consider the role of cognitive conflict in facilitating qualitative change. Fifth, I 
consider the pedagogical implications of Posner and colleagues’ (1982) theory of 
conceptual change. Finally, I consider the relevance of the conceptual change 
literature to the research on adolescents’ legal reasoning capacities. 
Part III: Specification of Treatment 
  According to Kazdin (1997), to ease the disseminability of interventions 
researchers should “operationalize” the procedures of the intervention (p. 119). 
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Furthermore, researchers should explicitly state how the specific procedures conform 
to the theoretical model.  
In Part III, I provide a detailed description of the Miranda Rights Educational 
Curriculum and describe how the curriculum conforms to the model of conceptual 
change.  
Part I: Conceptualization of the Dysfunction 
Defining the Scope of the Dysfunction 
   In the next sections I consider two potential frameworks for defining the 
scope of capacities/abilities that are relevant to the decisions adolescents make about 
their legal rights: (a) the informed consent framework, and (b) the judgment 
framework.   
The Informed Consent Framework 
  Evaluations of a criminal defendant’s legal decision-making capacity are 
typically conceptualized within the informed consent framework (Grisso, 2003). This 
framework, developed to assess an individual’s capacity to consent to or refuse 
proposed medical interventions, requires that the individual must (a) be provided 
information relevant for the decision, (b) make the choice voluntarily, and (c) be 
competent to decide (Berg, Appelbaum, Lidz, & Parker, 2001).   
Translated to the assessment of a defendant’s capacity to waive rights, these 
evaluations generally assess three broad classes of functional abilities (Grisso, 2003). 
First, does the defendant understand his Miranda rights (i.e., does the defendant have 
factual understanding of his rights?)? Second, does the defendant appreciate the 
significance and intended functions of the Miranda rights in an interrogation (i.e., 
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does the defendant understand how these rights apply to his current situation?; does 
the defendant understand the adversarial nature of an interrogation?; does the 
defendant understand that his attorney is his advocate?; does the defendant 
understand that the right against self-incrimination is irrevocable?)? Third, does the 
defendant perceive the risks of waiving his rights, and is the defendant capable of 
reasoning about these risks (i.e., can the defendant identify the consequences of 
waiving his rights?; is the defendant capable of making a choice in a rational, 
decision-making process?)? 
Under the informed consent standard, the decision maker is allowed to make poor 
legal decisions based on “idiosyncratic” values as long as he can demonstrate factual 
understanding of, and capacity to reason about, the relevant information (Scott, 
Repucci, & Woolard, 1995, p. 227). The informed consent standard assumes that 
decisions should “reflect the subjective values and preferences of decision makers” 
and that “no external measure of outcomes is appropriate” (Scott, Repucci, & 
Woolard, 1995, p. 223).  Indeed, the Supreme Court has argued that the adult 
defendant has “an almost absolute right” to waive counsel as long as he is “aware of 
the dangers and disadvantages of self representation” and “elects self-representation 
in a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent fashion” (Faretta v. California, 1975). 
The Judgment Framework 
 While acknowledging that the informed consent framework affords a distinct 
advantage to adult decision makers, developmental theorists (e.g., Cauffman & 
Steinberg, 2000; Scott, Reppuci, & Woolard, 1995; Steinberg & Cauffman, 1996) 
have argued that this framework does not address all factors critically relevant to the 
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decision making of adolescents. These theorists hypothesized that, in addition to the 
cognitive abilities specified by the informed consent framework, certain age-linked, 
developmental characteristics (e.g., “temporal perspective,” “risk preference and risk 
appraisal,” “compliance with authority,” and “resistance to peer influence”1) 
compromise the adolescent’s capacity to value, appreciate, and weigh the significance 
of legal rights. Indeed, research suggests that certain developmental factors may 
evolve over the course of adolescence and into adulthood. 
 Temporal Perspective.  Temporal perspective refers to an individual’s capacity to 
identify, incorporate, and weigh the significance of the potential long-term 
consequences of alternative options (Woolard, 2003).  While adults tend to weigh the 
long-term consequences of a decision more heavily than the short-term results, 
adolescents tend to attach greater significance to short-term consequences (Cauffman 
& Steinberg, 2000; Gardner & Hermann, 1990; Greene, 1986). Furthermore, 
adolescents find short-term consequences to be more salient than long-term 
                                                 
1 Importantly, not all of the developmental characteristics identified by Scott, 
Repucci and Woolard (1995) are necessarily relevant to an adolescent’s decision to 
waive or assert legal rights (Grisso and Schwartz, 2000). Specifically, an adolescent’s 
tendency to conform to peer influence may be extremely influential to the 
adolescent’s decision of whether or not to engage in criminal behaviors and is thus 
relevant to the question of the adolescent’ culpability; however, this characteristic 
may be less influential during a police interrogation situation when the adolescent is 
isolated from peers. Thus, for the purposes of this study, we will not investigate the 
influence of peer conformity on adolescents’ decision to waive or assert rights. 
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consequences when evaluating alternative courses of action (Allen, Leadbeater, & 
Aber, 1990). Thus, adolescents may fail to recognize, consider, and incorporate long-
range consequences in the decision- making process (Scott & Grisso, 2004). 
 Risk Orientation. Risk orientation refers to the individual’s capacity to: (a) 
identify the potential negative consequences of alternative courses of action, (b) 
assess the likelihood of those negative consequences occurring, and (c) imagine how 
unpleasant the negative consequences would be if they did occur (Woolard, 2003). In 
general, youth appear to take more risks than adults (Scott & Grisso, 2004). For 
example, youth engage in drunk driving, unprotected sex, and criminal activity more 
frequently than do adults (Arnett, 1992). Although adolescents appear to have the 
capacity to identify relevant risks when making choices, they appear to conduct the 
cost-benefit analysis differently than do adults.  Specifically, when making choices 
youth tend to weigh anticipated gains more heavily than anticipated losses (Furby & 
Beyth-Marom, 1990; Gardner, Herman & Wilfong, 1991).  
Compliance with Authority. Research suggests that younger adolescents may be 
more likely than older adolescents and young adults to choose alternatives that 
comply with the requests of authority figures. For example, Grisso and colleagues 
(2003) found that 11 through 15 year olds were more likely than 16 through 21 year 
olds to recommend “confessing to the police” as the best alternative for the suspect in 
a hypothetical vignette about a police interrogation. Similarly, Redlich and Goodman 
(2003) found that younger adolescents were more likely to comply with the requests 
of authority figures than older adolescents and adults. Specifically, investigators 
falsely accused participants (ages 12 through 26) of crashing a computer. Younger 
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adolescent (i.e., ages 12 through 16) were more likely to sign a false confession at the 
request of an authority figure (i.e., the investigators) than were older adolescents and 
adults (i.e., ages 17 through 26).  
In theory, temporal perspective, risk appraisal/preference, and compliance with 
authority influence the adolescent’s decision to waive or assert rights by affecting the 
subjective value he attaches to the potential consequences of this decision (Grisso, 
2000). Applied to the context of interrogation, the adolescent’s capacity to value and 
appreciate his legal rights may be compromised by these characteristics; he may 
prefer the benefits associated with serving other competing and incompatible interests 
over the benefits associated with asserting his rights (Buss, 2000). For example, if he 
lacks temporal perspective, he may waive his rights because he attaches more value to 
immediate rewards (e.g., the possibility of ending an interrogation), than to longer-
term benefits (e.g., safeguarding his legal defense by asserting his rights). If he lacks 
risk orientation, he may waive his rights because he attaches more significance to the 
risk of angering a police officer than to the risk of damaging his legal defense.  
 Using the Judgment Framework to Conceptualize the Dysfunction 
Scott, Repucci, and Woolard (1995)  argued that a “judgment framework” 
designed to incorporate cognitive and developmental factors better “captures the mix 
of cognitive and psychosocial factors” that influence adolescent decisions (p. 222). 
“Our goal is to propose a model to compare adolescent and adult decision making that 
incorporates this broader range of factors…as well as those included under an 
informed consent model” (p. 222). Cauffman and Steinberg (2000) characterized the 
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model as “neither exclusively cognitive nor exclusively psychosocial” but, rather, as 
the “byproduct of both sets of influences” (p. 328).  
Using the judgment framework, we can “operationalize” the 
capacities/abilities that influence adolescents’ decisions about the rights to silence and 
legal counsel:  
 1. The adolescent will need factual understanding of the Miranda warnings, 
including an understanding of relevant vocabulary and phrases (e.g. “attorney,” 
“right,” “appointed to you”). 
 2. The adolescent will need to understand the concept of a “right.” More 
specifically, he will need to (a) conceptualize a right as an entitlement rather than as a 
contingency bestowed or revoked at the discretion of adults, (b) understand that the 
decision to assert or waive his rights is within his exclusive control, (c) understand 
that he cannot be punished by the legal system for asserting his rights, and (d) 
understand that he can end the interrogation immediately by requesting an attorney.  
 3. The adolescent will need to recognize the risks associated with waiving his 
rights (i.e., that discussing the crime in question may be detrimental to his legal 
defense) and weigh this risk more heavily than the risks associated with asserting his 
rights (e.g., displeasing his parents or a police officer). 
  4. He will need to understand the role of the police officer and the defense 
attorney in an interrogation. At the most basic level, he will need to understand that 
the police officer’s role in an interrogation is adversarial, while the defense attorney is 
intended to serve as his advocate, regardless of his guilt or innocence. 
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5.  He will need to prioritize his legal defense over the benefits of serving 
competing and incompatible interests. First, he will need to attach more value to the 
longer-term benefits of preserving his legal defense than to the shorter-term benefits 
of complying with police authority. Shorter-term benefits might include the 
immediate gratification or relief experienced by acquiescing to coercion, praise and 
positive reinforcement from the police officer, and avoiding a negative consequence 
implied by the police officer (e.g., the officer implies that asserting the right to 
counsel will “make him look guilty”). Second, he will need to attach greater 
significance to the risks associated with waiving his rights than to the risks associated 
with asserting his rights. Perceived risks associated with asserting his rights include 
angering a police officer and the stress associated with withholding information. 
Third, he will have to resist the inclination to comply with authority. Although 
compliance with authority may normally be adaptive, he will have to understand that 
the negative consequences associated with waiving rights during a police 
interrogation outweigh the potential positive consequences of cooperating with the 
police. 
Limitations of the Judgment Framework  
 I have used the judgment framework to conceptualize the scope of the 
dysfunction. However, several limitations of the framework are noteworthy. First, 
although I hypothesize that adolescents who demonstrate these capacities are better 
able to make legal decisions, the fulfillment of these capacities offers no guarantee 
that the adolescent will engage in a rational, decision-making process. As the totality 
of circumstances test suggests, external factors (e.g., time of day that the interrogation 
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takes place, length of time the suspect is held incommunicado, conditions of the 
interrogation room, severity of the charges, police demeanor, etc.) associated with the 
context of the interrogation may strongly influence the adolescent’s decision (Grisso, 
2003). Second, the capacities specified by the judgment framework are not 
exhaustive. The defendant’s beliefs about the efficacy of the legal process, beliefs 
about police officers and authority, level of suggestibility, and level of assertiveness 
may critically impact the adolescent’s decision to waive or assert rights. Third, I do 
not assume that each of these capacities bare equal influence on the adolescent’s 
decision to waive or assert rights. Different capacities may be differentially relevant 
at different ages and at different levels of understanding. 
Defining the Dysfunction: A Review of the Literature 
Research suggests that younger adolescents may have deficits in each of the 
capacities/abilities specified by the judgment framework. As previously discussed, 
although youth may demonstrate considerable individual differences in legal 
decision-making capacities, younger adolescents (i.e., under the age of 15) may: (a) 
lack basic comprehension of the Miranda rights (Grisso, 1981; Abramovitch & 
Peterson-Badali, 1995; Abramovitch, Higgins & Biss, 1993); (b) conceptualize rights 
as contingencies (Grisso 1981; Wall & Furlong, 1985); (c) misperceive the role of a 
defense attorney in interrogation (Buss, 2000); (d) misperceive the probable 
consequences of waiver and non-waiver decisions (Grisso, 1981); (e) lack the 
developmental capacities to make decisions about legal rights (Grisso et al., 2003; 
Cauffman & Steinberg, 2000).  
 Comprehension  
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 Research suggests that younger adolescents lack basic comprehension of the 
Miranda rights. Grisso (1981) investigated whether adolescents and adults from 
detained and community samples understood the content, significance, and function 
of the Miranda warnings. Results indicated that compared with adults, juveniles 
demonstrated significantly poorer comprehension. More specifically, adolescents 
younger than 15 years old failed to meet both the absolute standard (defined as 
demonstrating “adequate understanding” of each of the Miranda warnings on an 
instrument assessing comprehension of the Miranda rights) and relative standard 
(defined as the level of comprehension of the Miranda warnings that is comparable to 
adults’ comprehension of the Miranda warnings) of comprehension.  
 Several studies have supported Grisso’s findings. Abramovitch and Peterson-
Badali (1995) found that older adolescents were more likely than younger adolescents 
to assert the right to silence. Abramovitch, Higgins and Biss (1993) found that 
younger adolescents did not understand the implications of waiving the rights to 
silence and counsel. More recently, Goldstein and colleagues (2003) found that age 
and IQ predicted Miranda comprehension in a sample of delinquent youth. Older 
adolescents demonstrated better comprehension than younger adolescents, and 
adolescents with higher IQ’s demonstrated better comprehension than adolescents 
with lower IQ’s.  
Conceptualization of Rights 
 In general, adolescents appear to have difficulty conceptualizing rights as 
entitlements. Research suggests that adolescents tend to conceptualize rights as 
contingencies that are bestowed and revoked at the discretion of adults. Although 
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Melton (1980) found that by age 14, the majority of adolescents accurately 
characterized rights as entitlements, other studies suggest that even older adolescents 
continue to mischaracterize rights as contingencies (Read, as cited in Grisso & 
Schwartz, 2000). Grisso (1980) and Wall and Furlong (1985) found that the many 
adolescents tended to misconstrue a right as something one is “allowed” to do. 
Furthermore, these studies suggested that adolescents failed to recognize the 
durability of the right to silence; the majority of adolescents believed that judges 
could force them to offer self-incriminating information in court (e.g., the judge could 
force them to confess to involvement in the crime).  
  Role of the Defense Attorney 
 Some research suggests that adolescents may misperceive the role of the 
defense attorney. Peterson-Badali and Abramovitch (1992) found that younger 
adolescents often believed that defense attorneys were authorized to disclose 
confidential information about the defendant to judges or police officers. 
Furthermore, some research indicates that adolescents believe that defense attorneys 
only defend the innocent. Grisso (1981) observed found that a sizable percentage of 
detained adolescents believed that defense attorneys could decide whether or not to 
represent the defendant based on the defendant’s guilt or innocence.  
Consequences of Waiver and Non-waiver Decisions 
 Research suggests that adolescents misperceive the probable consequences of 
waiver and non-waiver decisions.  Grisso (1981) found that delinquent adolescents 
believed that if they waived rights, the police would decide not to press charges, and 
the judge would be lenient during sentencing. Conversely, delinquent adolescents 
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believed that if they asserted their rights, police and court officials would perceive 
them as guilty, police would become angry and punish them, and interrogation would 
continue until they cooperated (as cited in Grisso, 1981).   
  Deficits in Judgment  
 To date, only one study has examined the relationship between temporal 
perspective, risk appraisal, and compliance with authority and the decisions 
adolescents make about legal rights. Grisso and colleagues (2003) compared 
adolescents’ and adults’ capacities as trial defendants. To assess developmental 
influences on legal decisions, the researchers presented participants with three 
decision-making vignettes: (a) responding to police interrogation, (b) disclosing 
information during consultation with an attorney, and (c) responding to a plea 
agreement. Participants were asked to provide advice to the defendant in each 
vignette. Responses were scored according to criteria designed to assess risk 
appraisal, risk preference, and temporal perspective. For both the interrogation and 
plea agreement vignettes, there was a significant effect for age on the choices 
participants made for the defendant. Specifically, younger adolescents (e.g., the 11 
through 13 year olds) were more likely than older adolescents (e.g., the 16 through 17 
year olds) to make choices that complied with the requests of authority figures (e.g., 
confessing to the police rather than asserting the right to silence). Adolescents were 
more likely to recommend waiving rights during interrogation than were adults. 
Specifically, 55% of 11 through 13 year olds, 40% of 14 through 15 year olds, and 
30% of 16 through 17 year olds advised the defendant to admit his involvement in the 
crime rather than to remain silent, whereas only 15% of young adults (ages 18 
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through 24) made this choice. Furthermore, younger adolescents recognized fewer 
long-term risks associated with waiving rights than did older adolescents and were 
less likely than other age groups to provide long-range, future consequences in 
explaining their choices.  
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Are Deficits in These Capacities “Variable” Risk Factors? 
         Hypothetically, an instructional intervention could facilitate an adolescent’s 
factual understanding of the content, purpose, and function of the Miranda warnings. 
However, it seems less likely that an instructional intervention could facilitate factors 
that are functions of adolescent development (e.g., temporal perspective, risk 
orientation, and compliance with authority). Specifically, it seems less likely that an 
instructional intervention could change adolescents’ valuation of rights or change 
adolescents’ beliefs about the efficacy of rights. Indeed, even if an instructional 
intervention could improve a youth’s understanding of his legal rights, it is quite 
plausible that developmental factors could impede the effective use of his new 
cognitive skills. For example, imagine that a 14 year- old boy is interrogated by the 
police about an armed robbery. The suspect has a basic understanding of his Miranda 
rights and how these rights apply to his current situation. However, he values the 
short-term benefits associated with cooperating with the police (e.g., relief 
experienced from acquiescing to authority) over the long-term benefits of asserting 
his rights (e.g., safeguarding his legal defense). Thus, despite his excellent 
understanding of the Miranda warnings, he chooses to waive his rights to serve a 
competing interest. 
            Scott and Grisso (2004) highlighted the dilemma posed by this example: 
“Conventional remedies for incompetent defendants (e.g., instructional interventions 
designed to restore competence) may have little meaning as applied to youths who 
have never been competent, and for whom maturation is the only effective remedy” 
(p. 1).  
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The implication underlying Scott and Grisso’s observation is that sound legal 
decision making requires more than factual knowledge of the law and legal processes. 
Indeed, the development of legal reasoning skills seems to require not only a 
quantitative change in the individual’s repertoire of legal knowledge, but also 
qualitative changes in the individual’s interpretative, conceptual framework (i.e., the 
system of personal preferences, values, beliefs, and heuristics the individual uses to 
approach legal dilemmas).  
            Thus, the questions become how and when do these qualitative changes 
occur? Is it possible to facilitate qualitative change, or is qualitative change merely a 
function of cognitive and physical maturation? Is it possible to facilitate changes in 
judgment? Although maturation clearly plays a crucial role in the development of 
reasoning capacities, can we identify an additional mechanism of change? If so, can 
we translate this mechanism into pedagogical strategy? Finally, at what age could an 
adolescent begin to benefit from an instructional intervention designed to teach the 
content, significance, and function of the Miranda warnings?  
Part II: Conceptualization of Treatment 
Development of Legal Reasoning Capacities  
 Developmental theorists have designated ages 12 through 16 as the 
“watershed period for thought on matters of government and law” (Levine & Tapp, 
1977, p. 87). Indeed, critical advancements in the capacity for abstract reasoning 
occur during this period. By mid-adolescence, youths’ cognitive capacities begin to 
approximate the cognitive capacities of adults (Scott & Grisso, 2004). More 
specifically, adolescents become capable of: (a) imagining alternative courses of 
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action, (b) identifying hypothetical consequences to various alternatives, (c) 
considering situations from others’ perspectives, and (d) engaging in comparative 
deliberation about alternatives and consequences ( Furby & Beyth-Marom, 1990; 
Grisso & Vierling, 1978; Mann, Harmoni, & Power, 1989). Furthermore, adolescence 
is characterized by improvements in basic information processing skills, such as 
organization, sustained attention, and short- and long-term memory (Scott & Grisso, 
2004).  
In addition to the research demonstrating general improvements in 12 through 
16 year olds’ cognitive functioning, research specific to legal decision making has 
also highlighted the significance of these years. Between pre- and late-adolescence, 
youth begin to: (a) accurately conceptualize rights as entitlements (Melton, 1980); (b) 
comprehend the Miranda warnings as well as adults (Grisso, 1981); (c) achieve the 
adult standard of adjudicative competence (Cowden & McKee, 1995); (d) use 
relevant information when weighing the risks of  plea bargaining options (Peterson-
Badali & Abramovitch, 1993); (e) begin to recognize the importance of safeguarding 
civil liberties (e.g., right to privacy, right to free speech) with formal legislation 
(Gallatin & Adelson, 1977; Zellman & Sears, 1977); (f) acknowledge that laws that 
infringe on civil liberties should be challenged (Gallatin & Adelson, 1977; Zellman & 
Sears, 1977); and (g) identify the long term risks associated with decisions to waive 
important legal rights (Grisso et al., 2003). 
In summary, although there is considerable variability in the rates at which the 
capacities necessary for complex decision making develop, a substantial body of 
research suggests that, in general, younger adolescents (i.e., youth under the age of 
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14) differ significantly from older adolescents (i.e., youth ages 16 through 18) with 15 
year olds displaying “similarities to and differences from both groups” (Scott & 
Grisso, 2004, p. 27). 
Legal Development Theory 
 Although the development of legal reasoning appears to parallel these 
cognitive advances, little is known about the specific process through which 
adolescents develop knowledge, beliefs, attitudes, expectancies, and values about the 
law and legal proceedings. The extant literature on the development of legal 
reasoning is largely theoretical. At present, Legal Development Theory (LDT) (Tapp 
& Kolhberg, 1977) provides the most comprehensive description of the development 
of legal reasoning from childhood through young adulthood.  
 LDT closely parallels Kohlberg’s theory of moral development. On the basis 
of research, Kolhberg (1963, 1969) identified six stages of moral reasoning which he 
classified into three general levels: (a) the Pre-conventional level (comprised of Stage 
1, “Obedience and Punishment,” and Stage 2, “Instrumental Exchange”);  (b) the 
Conventional level (comprised of Stage 3, “Interpersonal Conformity,” and Stage 4, 
“Law and Order”); and (c) the Post-conventional level (comprised of Stage 5, “Prior 
Rights and Social Contract,” and Stage 6, “Universal Ethical Principles”). According 
to Kohlberg, pre-conventional reasoners determine the morality of an action based on 
the consequences of that action; actions followed by punishment are morally wrong, 
while actions that comply with authority are morally right. While pre-conventional 
reasoners prioritize actions that promote personal interests, conventional reasoners 
prioritize actions that promote social welfare; actions that promote social welfare are 
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morally right, while actions that threaten social welfare are morally wrong.  Finally, 
post-conventional reasoners prioritize ethical principles such as human rights and 
social justice; actions that violate these ethical principles are morally wrong. 
Furthermore, post-conventional reasoners characterize laws as social contracts rather 
than as dictums. Thus, these reasoners contend that laws that violate ethical principles 
must be changed.   
  Tapp and Kohlberg (1977) argued that the concepts central to moral 
reasoning (e.g., justice, social welfare, social contract) were also central to legal 
reasoning. After interviewing children, adolescents, and young adults about the 
function of law, Tapp and Kohlberg (1977) postulated that Kohlberg’s paradigm 
could be used to describe the development of legal reasoning. Specifically, on the 
basis of these interviews, the investigators identified three stages of legal 
development: (a) the “pre-conventional perspective,” or sanction-oriented, rule-
obeying perspective, (b) the “conventional perspective,” or rule-maintaining 
perspective, and the (c) “post-conventional perspective,” or rule-making perspective. 
  According to the authors, individuals classified as pre-conventional reasoners 
believe that laws functioned to prevent physical harm, people should comply with 
laws to avoid punishment, and laws were unchangeable. Individuals classified as 
conventional reasoners believe that laws functioned to maintain social order,  people 
should follow laws in order to be productive members of society, and extreme 
circumstances could justify breaking or changing the law (e.g., changing a law that 
threatened social order). Individuals classified as post-conventional reasoners 
believed that laws served to maximize personal and social welfare, people should 
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follow laws based on utilitarian considerations, and laws that are immoral and unjust 
should be changed.  
 Limitations of the Cognitive Developmental Paradigm  
 Over the past several decades, developmental theorists (e.g., Broughton, 1986; 
Flavell, 1977; Gardner, Scherer, Tester, 1989; Gilligan, 1982) have criticized stage 
theories of cognitive and moral development on several grounds. These theorists 
argue that individuals do not progress through a series of invariant, distinctly defined 
cognitive stages. Rather, the theorists contend that cognitive abilities appear to be 
more contextualized; individuals may demonstrate a particular ability in one domain, 
but not in others (Flavell, 1977).  Additionally, some theorists suggest that 
characterizing cognitive growth as the progression towards autonomous reasoning 
reflects cultural bias, not biological fact (Broughton, 1986; Gilligan, 1982). Societies 
that prioritize the collective welfare over the welfare of individuals, may not consider 
autonomous reasoning to be the highest level of reasoning.  Thus, these theorists 
claim that the cognitive developmental paradigm cannot be characterized as 
“universal” (Cohn & White, 1990, p. 39). 
 While recognizing the limitations of stage theories, Cohn and White (1990) 
argued that the mechanism of change specified by the cognitive developmental 
paradigm continues to have “great utility” when used to describe the process through 
which individuals develop legal reasoning skills (p. 39).  According to the authors, 
mischaracterizing the paradigm as “invariant” and “universal,” does not imply that 
the mechanism of change identified by the paradigm is an “inaccurate 
characterization” of how individuals acquire the capacity to reason about complex 
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legal dilemmas (p. 39). Indeed, in a point of departure from Kohlberg and Piaget, 
Levine and Tapp (1977) emphasized the heuristic intent of LDT. The authors 
contended that the development of legal reasoning is not the function of an “ordered, 
mutually exclusive progression.” Rather, the model proposes a set of “working 
hypotheses” that describe how adolescents develop legal reasoning abilities (p. 167). 
Identifying the Mechanism of Change 
 According to LDT, two primary processes underlie the development of legal 
reasoning (Levine & Tap, 1977). First, the individual must achieve “substantive 
competence,” or a basic factual understanding of the law and legal processes. Second, 
the individual must experience conceptual change. More specifically, he must 
experience a radical shift in the conceptual framework (i.e., the system of knowledge, 
beliefs, attitudes, heuristics, and values that individuals use to analyze the external 
environment) 
that he uses to approach legal dilemmas.  
  Although substantive competence serves to “expand” the child’s capacity to 
“understand problems, define expectations, relate to events, press claims, invoke a 
right, and redress a grievance,” the authors contended that legal knowledge alone is 
“insufficient for stimulating integrative, accommodative, and critical thought” 
(Levine & Tapp, 1977, p. 174).  Indeed, the authors argued that the development of 
legal reasoning involves not only quantitative changes in factual knowledge, but also 
qualitative changes in how the individual interprets, conceptualizes, and values legal 
information. Thus, the authors designated the experience of cognitive conflict as a 
necessary condition for achieving legal competence.  
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The Role of Cognitive Conflict in Cognitive Development 
  Tapp and Levine (1977) underscored the critical role of cognitive conflict in 
facilitating the development of legal reasoning. Broadly defined, cognitive conflict 
refers to a “state” in which an individual recognizes that his interpretative, conceptual 
framework inadequately accounts for his experience (Lee et al., 2003). This 
inadequacy motivates the individual to seek alternative explanations with which to 
construct a new conceptual framework.  
Developmental theorists have long argued that cognitive conflict plays a 
facilitative role in intellectual growth. Dewey (1910) asserted that the experience of 
cognitive uncertainty serves to motivate the observer to achieve a higher level of 
understanding. Festinger (1957) asserted that the perception of inconsistency between 
expectancy and experience generates “psychological discomfort” or “cognitive 
dissonance.” The individual finds the experience of cognitive dissonance aversive and 
is, thus, motivated to resolve the discrepancy. Similarly, Berlyne (1960) argued that 
the experience of conceptual conflict increases the salience of discrepant information, 
motivating the learner to resolve the paradox.  
Piaget’s Model of Equilibration 
  Drawing on Piaget’s model of cognitive growth, Tapp and Levine (1977) 
argued that legal development occurs through “equilibration,” a process fueled by 
cognitive conflict. According to Piaget’s model, individuals actively use information 
from the environment to construct mental representations of experience, or schemata. 
These schemata become conceptual frameworks that the individual uses to generate 
beliefs, values, expectancies, heuristics, and behaviors. “Adaptive” schemata are 
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mental representations of reality that are congruent with, and adequately account for, 
experience. When existing schema are in conflict with the external environment, the 
individual is in a state of “disequilbria.” The balance between schema and external 
reality is offset, motivating the individual to modify the existing schema to account 
for the contradiction. In effect, the experience of conflict or disequilibria impels the 
individual to make cognitive progress.  
Piaget used the model of equilibration to explain the development of 
conservation of liquid quantity (Flavell, 1977). A pre-schooler, who has not yet 
achieved conservation, concludes that there is more water in the tall, thin glass than in 
the short, fat glass. In her comparison, she attends to the physical appearance of the 
water and bases her conclusion on the principle, “things that appear bigger, are in fact 
bigger.” According to Piaget, she “assimilates” the information, or interprets the data 
according to a pre-established system of rules and heuristics. However, suppose that 
at some point in her development she attends to the fact that the same amount of 
water has been transferred from the shorter, fatter glass to the taller, thinner glass. She 
begins to question the applicability of the principle, “things that appear bigger, are 
bigger” to the current situation.  Now, there are two plausible, but contradictory, 
conclusions. First, under the old set of heuristics, the higher level of water indicates 
that there is more water in the second glass. Second, the transfer of the same amount 
of water from the first to the second glass indicates that both glasses contain equal 
amounts of water. Faced with an apparent contradiction, the child’s cognitive system 
has moved from a state of “equilibrium” (schema adequately accounts for experience) 
to disequilbrium (schema inadequately accounts for experience). The distress initiated 
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by the imbalance motivates the child to account for the contradiction. On the basis of 
her observation that the same amount of water has been transferred between the 
glasses, she “accommodates,” or adapts, her schema to include a new rule: “height 
increase and width decrease are mutually compensatory changes” (Flavell, 1977, p. 
242).  Thus, she concludes that despite the physical transformation of the water, the 
quantity of water remains unchanged.  
In summary, the motivation to resolve the apparent contradiction facilitates 
the child’s cognitive development. By adopting a new interpretative framework, she 
re-equilibrates at a higher developmental level. As will be argued later, I hypothesize 
that the development of legal decision-making skills will require adolescents to adopt 
a new interpretative framework to approach the dilemma posed by a police 
interrogation (i.e., cooperate with the police or assert rights); adolescents will need to 
re-equilibrate at a higher developmental level.  
Research Supporting the Role of Cognitive Conflict in Intellectual Growth 
Many developmental theorists have questioned whether equilibration 
adequately accounts for all cognitive growth. Flavell (1977) argued that “no single, 
overarching process or principle” sufficiently describes “how all cognitive 
developmental advances are made.” Rather, he contended that, while equilibration 
had considerable explanatory power for certain types of knowledge acquisition, 
“different sets of processes may typically be involved in different kinds of 
acquisitions” (p. 243). Indeed, Piaget (1960) himself recognized that equilibration 
was not the only significant factor in cognitive development. He also noted that 
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biological and social maturation played critical roles in the facilitation of reasoning 
abilities (1960).   
Although cognitive conflict may neither be necessary nor sufficient for 
cognitive development, research suggests conflict may play a facilitative role in 
intellectual growth (Chapman, 1992).  In the following section, I summarize research 
that supports the role of conflict in cognitive growth.  
Evidence from developmental psychology. Inhelder, Sinclair, and Bovet 
(1974) conducted a series of studies to investigate whether instructional interventions 
could facilitate the process of equilibration.  Specifically, the researchers investigated 
whether children could be taught the concept of conservation.  First, the researchers 
tested children to ascertain their initial cognitive level. The researchers classified 
children as non-conservers (i.e., children who focused primarily on the appearance of 
the liquid and who demonstrated no understanding of concept of conservation), 
intermediate conservers (i.e., children who were able to accurately apply the concept 
of conservation in some instances but not in others), and full conservers (i.e., children 
who were able to apply the concept of conservation accurately to all situations and 
demonstrated full understanding of the concept of compensatory changes between 
dimensions). Next, the children received an instructional intervention designed to 
expose the contradictions in their reasoning. Results indicated that children benefited 
from instruction; however, the extent to which the children improved depended on 
their initial level of understanding. For example, although only 2 of 15 children 
initially classified as non-conservers achieved full conversation following instruction, 
11 of 19 children initially classified as intermediate conservers became full 
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conservers following instruction. The authors reasoned, “the source of the progress is 
to be sought in the disequilibrium which incites the subject to go beyond his present 
state in search of new solutions” (p. 264).  
Roy and Howe (1990) found that inducing cognitive conflict by presenting 
children with statements that conflicted with the initial judgments, facilitated 
children’s reasoning about legal transgressions. Furthermore, Vincenzo and Kelly 
(1987) found that children who were exposed to conflicting perspectives were more 
successful at problem-solving tasks than children exposed to a singular perspective. 
Additionally, several studies suggest that cognitive conflict may play a 
facilitative role in the development of moral reasoning. Walker (1983) found that 
middle schoolers who had been exposed to both sides of a moral dilemma performed 
better on a test of moral reasoning than did students who were exposed to one side of 
a moral dilemma. Similarly, Turiel (1966) and Tracy and Cross (1973) found that 
exposing youth to both sides of the Heinz dilemma facilitated moral reasoning.    
The Role of Prior Knowledge in Learning 
After conducting their conservation experiments, Inhelder, Bovet and Sinclair 
(1974) noted:  
We can hypothesize that the children who do not make any cognitive progress are 
unable to establish the necessary relationships between the different observable 
features of the situation. In other words, the observable features of the situation are 
assimilated only if the child is able to incorporate them into the schemes he already 
has. (p. 58)   
The authors’ observation belies the paradox of cognitive maturation: prior 
knowledge is both “necessary and problematic to learning” (Roschelle, 1995, p. 39). 
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On the one hand, the learner must rely on extant frameworks to interpret phenomena; 
on the other hand the system of flawed rules and heuristics that comprise the extant 
framework may prevent the learner from accurately evaluating phenomena. Thus, 
cognitive maturation does not require the elimination of prior knowledge per se, but 
rather the reconstruction of prior knowledge. The following sections address the role 
of prior knowledge in learning and the role of pedagogy in facilitating the process of 
reconstruction. 
 The Prevalence and Durability of Misconceptions 
 Ausubel (1968) noted that students often enter the classroom with 
misconceptions about the topic of study. He further observed that these 
misconceptions were “amazingly tenacious and resistant to extinction,” prompting 
him to remark, “the most important single factor influencing learning is what the 
learner already knows” (as cited in Kyle, Family, & Shymansky, 1989). 
Indeed, research suggests that misconceptions (i.e., commonsense beliefs 
about a particular area of study that are contrary to known evidence) are prevalent 
across a variety of academic domains, including physics, biology, economics, 
astronomy, government, psychology, and cosmology (Carey, 1985; Driver, Guesne, 
& Tiberghien, 1985; Kowalski & Taylor, 2004; Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992). For 
example, Standing and Huber (2003) found that 71% of undergraduates surveyed 
endorsed common myths in psychology (e.g., “people use 10% of their brain’s 
capacity;” “someone with schizophrenia suffers from a split personality”).  
This same body of research suggests that students often maintain 
misconceptions even after receiving intensive instruction in the subject matter. 
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Studies examining the effect of college level psychology courses suggest there is only 
limited change in students’ false beliefs following instruction. For example, Kowalski 
and Taylor (2001) found that even after taken several psychology courses, many 
students continued to maintain misconceptions (as cited in Kowalski and Taylor, 
2004). Vaughn (1977) found that students’ misconceptions decreased by only 6.6% 
after receiving instruction in psychology. Furthermore, Gardner and Dalsing (1986) 
found that even after taking several psychology courses, 30% of college students 
continued to equate schizophrenia with “split personality.”  
A substantial body of literature documents the prevalence and durability of 
students’ misconceptions in the natural sciences (e.g., diSessa, 1982; Halloun & 
Hestene, 1985). Notably, diSessa (1982) found that even MIT freshman who had 
received an A in physics were unable to use the concepts of force, acceleration, and 
momentum to accurately describe a simple ball toss. Rather, the students tended to 
rely on commonsense beliefs about motion, describing the ball toss in terms of an 
“initial upward force” which “slowly dies out.” In another study, Champagne, 
Gunstone, and Klopfer (1985) found that many students who initially believed that 
heavier objects fall faster than lighter objects continued to endorse this belief even 
after watching a demonstration in which blocks of different sizes hit the ground 
simultaneously.    
Theorists have offered several explanations to account for the durability of 
students’ misconceptions. First, Chinn and Brewer (1993) observed that 
misconceptions often appear to have strong evidentiary support. For example, small 
children may often believe that the world is flat because this belief is supported by 
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their daily observations. Similarly, Zirbel (2004) noted that false beliefs often have 
considerable explanatory power. For example, she hypothesized that many students 
falsely believed “a constant force results in motion” because this heuristic was 
consistent with their personal observations and successful in describing a range of 
experiences:   
Most students will have driven a car and noticed that when they cease to press the 
gas pedal (i.e. apply a force), the car will slow down. Although they might know that 
there is friction… their personal experience is that in the absence of a force the car 
will slow down. Since this experience is repeated every time the student drives, it is 
no surprise that the student will develop an intuitive sense that a constant force 
results in motion. (p.5)  
Thus, given the explanatory power of “a constant force results in motion,” 
Zirbel (2004) argued that this misconception, and by extension, misconceptions with 
similar explanatory power, would be extremely difficult to extinguish. 
Second, Chinn and Brewer (1993) noted that misconceptions are often 
supported by ontological beliefs (i.e., an individual’s beliefs about the fundamental 
categories and properties of the world [Keil, 1979]).  Thus, according to the authors, 
students often struggle with abstract scientific concepts such as relativity, quantum 
mechanics, and string theory because these concepts violate their fundamental 
assumptions about how the world works (e.g., that time is linear, that time and space 
are distinct, etc.). 
 Finally, some theorists argue that instructional methods frequently fail to 
address students’ misconceptions and often, may even reinforce them. Research 
suggests that even science teachers may have misconceptions about important 
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scientific principles such as conservation of mass, oxidation and reduction, and the 
laws of thermodynamics (Chinn & Brewer, 1993).  For example, Brunsell and 
Marcks (2005) found that fewer than 50% of high school physics teachers were able 
to accurately characterize the distinction between radio and light waves. Thus, many 
educators may be unable to effectively convey important concepts to students, 
thereby indirectly reinforcing students’ misconceptions about scientific phenomena.  
Modifying Prior Knowledge: Conceptual Change Theory 
How do students accommodate more adaptive conceptual frameworks? 
Noting similarities between the process through which individuals modify conceptual 
frameworks and the process through which scientists modify theory, Posner, Strike, 
Hewson, and Gertzog (1982) argued that an analysis of the development of scientific 
theory could inform the analysis of how individuals construct new conceptual 
frameworks.  
Based on Kuhn’s description of scientific revolutions and Piaget’s model of 
equilibration, conceptual change theory (Posner, Strike, Hewson, & Gertzog, 1982) 
describes the process through which students modify existing conceptual frameworks.  
Posner and colleagues (1982) compared Kuhn’s “paradigm shift” to Piaget’s model of 
equilibration. According to Kuhn, scientific knowledge develops through cyclic 
periods of “consensus and dissention” (p. 360). Scientific revolutions occur when the 
current scientific paradigm, a framework for perceiving, interpreting, and valuing 
scientific phenomena, fails to explain some event. To solve the problem at hand, 
scientists must adopt a new scientific paradigm.  Thus, the processes through which 
scientists develop theory and individuals develop schema can be described using a 
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common language: scientists “assimilate” new information to their existing theories 
and “accommodate” these theories when presented with contradictory information. 
Similarly, individuals “assimilate” new data into existing cognitive schemata and 
“accommodate” these schemata to account for conflicting data (Carey, 1985; Carey; 
1986).  
 Conceptual Change is “Revolutionary” 
Kuhn (1970) argued that new scientific paradigms were “seldom or never just 
an increment to what is already known” (p. 7). Rather, the assimilation of a new 
paradigm required the reconstruction of prior theory and the re-evaluation of prior 
fact. Thus, according to Kuhn, a paradigm shift was an “intrinsically revolutionary 
process” (p. 7); when paradigms changed, the very definitions of what constituted 
scientific fact, evidence, and method changed as well; when paradigms changed, “the 
world itself changed with them” (p. 111).  
 Analogously, Strike and Posner (1992) characterized conceptual change as 
“revolutionary.” While declarative learning involved the accumulation of facts, 
conceptual change required the re-organization of extant frameworks to encompass 
new ideas, values, beliefs, and heuristics. Thus, conceptual change was 
“revolutionary” because it involved the alteration of concepts that were “central” to 
the individual’s framework for solving scientific dilemmas and for observing the 
world (p. 150); conceptual change was revolutionary in the sense that it involved the 
alteration of the individual’s fundamental beliefs about the world.  Indeed, the authors 
recognized that the “cost” required for the revision of these central concepts was 
“high.”   
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When a misconception is firmly embedded in a conceptual context, the cost required 
for its revision is high. Students will have to alter other concepts as well. Moreover, 
unless these other concepts are altered, they will continue to maintain the 
misconception. [It is important to remember] that students are being asked to 
abandon a concept that has seemed to be successful in explaining a range of 
experience.  (p. 154) 
 Thus, given the high cost of altering misconceptions, the experience and 
resolution of cognitive conflict was a necessary condition for conceptual change. 
Facilitating Conceptual Change 
Although Strike and Posner (1992) characterized their theory as 
“epistemological,” rather than “pedagogical,” the authors recognized the implications 
of their model for classroom instruction.  
  For conceptual change to occur in the classroom, the authors hypothesized 
four necessary conditions, dissatisfaction, intelligibility, plausibility, and fruitfulness. 
First, the learner must become dissatisfied with his current conceptual framework. He 
must recognize that there are inconsistencies in his current framework; he must 
recognize that his current framework does not solve the problem at hand. Second, the 
learner must find the new conceptual framework intelligible; he must understand the 
basic principles that comprise the conceptual framework. Third, the learner must find 
the new conceptual framework plausible; he must understand how to apply the 
framework to the dilemma at hand. Fourth, the learner must find the new conceptual 
framework fruitful; he must be able to generalize the framework to similar dilemmas. 
Thus, according to Posner and colleagues (1982), the role of science instruction must 
extend beyond merely informing students of “scientific conceptions.” Conceptual 
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change required exposing the inadequacies of students’ extant problem solving 
frameworks; students needed to be convinced that the alternative framework is more 
intelligible, plausible, and fruitful than their current frameworks (Posner et al., 1982).  
 Conceptual Change Instruction 
Educational researchers have developed models of pedagogy based on 
conceptual change theory (e.g., Nussbaum & Novick, 1982; Champagne, Gunstone, 
& Klopfer, 1985; Chinn & Brewer, 1993). Although the particulars of these 
approaches vary, conceptual change instruction generally includes the following core 
components: (a) activation of misconceptions (i.e., students’ erroneous, pre-
instructional beliefs about the topic of study); (b) presentation of the alternative 
theory (i.e., the accepted, evidence-based theory or explanation); (c) presentation of 
anomalous data (i.e., data that contradict, or fail to be explained by, students’ pre-
instructional beliefs about the topic of instruction, but can be explained by the 
alternative theory[Chinn & Brewer, 1993]); and (d) enhancement of deep-level 
learning (Chinn & Brewer, 1993).   
Activation of misconceptions. In order to stimulate theory change, teachers 
should first elicit students’ misconceptions about the topic of study (Chinn & Brewer, 
1993; Davis, 2001; Nussbaum & Novick, 1982). To activate misconceptions, 
conceptual change instruction often begins with the “exposing event” (Chinn & 
Brewer, 1993; Davis, 2001). The exposing event is any situation that requires 
students to use prior knowledge to either make predictions about the outcome of the 
event, or, if the outcome of the event is already known, to interpret the event. As 
students’ misconceptions frequently go unchallenged, students may be unaware that 
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their pre-instructional beliefs about the topic of study are inaccurate (Davis, 2001). 
Thus, teachers may need to anticipate common misconceptions in advance and be 
prepared to present data that undermines each of these misconceptions (Davis,  2001; 
Chinn & Brewer, 1993).   
Presentation of the alternative theory. The alternative theory is the accepted, 
evidence-based explanation that is the target of study. Davis (2001), Chinn and 
Brewer (1993), and Nussbaum and Novick (1982) asserted that teachers should guide 
students in evaluating the explanatory and predictive power of their various pre-
instructional beliefs during classroom discussion. If the discussion does generate the 
accepted explanation of the exposing event, the teacher should offer the scientific 
explanation as, simply, another alternative to be weighed and evaluated (Davis, 
2001).  
 Introducing Anomalous Data. After students’ misconceptions are activated, 
teachers should present anomalous data.  In theory, anomalous data precipitate theory 
change by (a) facilitating cognitive conflict (i.e., students’ existing frameworks 
cannot account for the discrepant data; thus, students become dissatisfied with their 
current theories and are motivated to seek alternative theories that can account for the 
discrepant data); and by (b) providing evidentiary support for the scientific theory 
(Chinn & Brewer, 1993). 
Enhancement of Deep-Level Learning. Unlike factual or “surface learning” 
which relies primarily on memorization, conceptual change requires “deep learning” 
(Chinn & Brewer, 1992). Deep learning requires students to make connections 
between prior knowledge and new material, critically evaluate the rationale for and 
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logical foundation of the new material, consider the implications of the new material, 
and generalize new knowledge to similar situations (Enwhistle, 2000). Pedagogical 
strategies that promote deep learning include: (a) increasing the personal salience of 
the material (Brophy, 2004); (b) specifying how the material is valuable and relevant 
to the students’ lives (Brophy, 2004); (c) encouraging students to justify and evaluate 
their responses during classroom discussion (Davis, 2001; Brophy, 2004); and (d) 
incorporating “reflective activities” (i.e., activities that provide students with the 
opportunity to reconcile differences between their pre-instructional beliefs and the 
target theory) into the curricula (Davis, 2001).  
Research on the Effectiveness of Conceptual Change Instruction  
Some research suggests that conceptual change instruction can facilitate 
students’ comprehension of complex subject matter more effectively than traditional, 
didactic methods of instruction. For example, Brown and Clement (1992) found that 
students acquired a more comprehensive understanding of key concepts in physics 
when instruction explicitly addressed and countered students’ commonly held 
misconceptions about the physical world.   
More recently, Alparslan, Tekkaya, and Geban (2003) investigated the effect 
of conceptual change instruction on high school student’s understanding of 
respiration. The investigators assigned students to either the experimental or control 
groups. The control group received traditional instruction in which the teacher 
provided instruction through lecture and discussion methods. The experimental group 
received instruction based on the model of conceptual change. Specifically, teachers 
provided these students with “conceptual change texts.” First, these texts required 
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students to explicitly acknowledge their pre-conceptions about respiration. Students 
evaluated these preconceptions during teacher-guided, classroom discussion. Second, 
to facilitate the students’ “dissatisfaction” with pre-conceptions, the texts provided 
students with data that were inconsistent with their extant conceptual models. Finally, 
the texts provided students with the accurate, scientific explanation of respiration. 
Again, students were encouraged to discuss the validity and explanatory power of the 
scientific explanation with peers. Thus, students in the experimental group were 
forced to actively examine the validity of prior conceptions.  
Prior to instruction, the experimenters pre-tested students from both groups to 
determine the students’ initial levels of understanding of respiration. Although both 
groups began instruction with equal understanding of respiration, at post test, the 
students who received conceptual change instruction demonstrated better 
comprehension of respiration than students who received traditional instruction. 
Furthermore, students who received traditional instruction continued to endorse false 
beliefs about respiration despite the fact that teachers provided the students with 
accurate, scientific explanations of respiration.  The authors concluded that 
conceptual change instruction that included the explicit elicitation of students’ pre-
instructional beliefs and the facilitation of cognitive conflict was paramount in 
facilitating theory change.  
Relevance of Conceptual Change to Legal Learning 
 Although conceptual change theory has generally been applied to science 
instruction, I contend that the conceptual change literature can inform the forensic 
research on adolescents’ legal reasoning capacities. I base this contention on three 
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primary grounds. First, adolescents have misconceptions about the content, function, 
and significance of the Miranda warnings and the purpose of interrogation. Second, 
these misconceptions are reinforced by personal experiences and observations, adult 
role models, and popular culture and are, thus, firmly entrenched in adolescents’ legal 
problem-solving frameworks. Third, the development of legal reasoning requires 
conceptual change.     
 Adolescents have misconceptions about the content, function, and significance 
of the Miranda warnings and the purpose of interrogation. Based on the research 
reviewed in this proposal, we hypothesize that younger adolescents (i.e., under the 
age of 15) have misconceptions about the content, function, and significance of the 
Miranda warnings. Common misconceptions about the Miranda rights and the 
interrogation process include: (a) “ If the police tell me I have to talk about the crime, 
then I have to (or, “Rights are given to me by the police, thus they have the power to 
take these rights away”); (b) “Even if I remain silent while the police are questioning 
me, the judge can force me to talk in court if he wants to. Therefore, why should I 
withstand the pressure to confess during police interrogation if I’m just going to have 
to confess to the judge when I go to court?;” (c) “If I cooperate with the police by 
waiving my rights, the police/judge may decide to be lenient with me;” (d) “If I assert 
my rights, the police/judge will think I am guilty;” (e) “The fastest way to end this 
interrogation is to cooperate with the police;” (f) “Even if I cooperate with the police 
now by discussing the crime, the truth will come out later in court;” (g) “Police are 
not allowed to mislead suspects during an interrogation;” (g) “It’s better to risk my 
legal defense than to risk the police officer getting mad at me for not cooperating” 
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(or, “Pleasing the police officer is more important than my legal defense);” (h) 
“Attorneys only help innocent people; if my attorney thinks I am involved in this 
crime, he’ll report me to the judge.” 
 These misconceptions comprise a flawed, yet common, “Miranda Rights 
Conceptual Framework.” Using this framework, younger adolescents base decisions 
about legal rights on erroneous expectancies about the consequences of waiver and 
non-waiver decisions. Given this flawed framework, younger adolescents may be 
oriented towards waiving their rights in a police interrogation situation. Thus, I 
hypothesize that younger adolescents generally adopt a waiver orientation towards 
rights, believing that it is in their best interests to waive rights and cooperate with the 
police.   
 These misconceptions are reinforced by personal experiences, adult role 
models, and popular culture. Consistent with arguments regarding the durability of 
misconceptions in psychology and the natural sciences, I contend that adolescents’ 
misconceptions about the Miranda warnings are deeply entrenched and resistant to 
change; specifically, these misconceptions are reinforced by personal experiences, 
adult role models, and popular culture. 
 First, adolescents maintain misconceptions about legal rights because these 
misconceptions derive evidentiary support from personal experiences and 
observations. For instance, as most youth depend on adults for emotional and 
financial support, they rely on adults to make important decisions about their well-
being. Youth may generalize to a police interrogation the heuristics, “when personal 
safety is at stake, cooperation with authority is the best alternative,” and “it is best to 
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tell the truth so as not to get into more trouble,” because these heuristics are generally 
supported by experiences in other contexts.  
 Second, the research reviewed in this proposal suggests that adolescents’ 
misconceptions about legal rights are reinforced by adult role models.  Feld observed 
that judges and court officials often encouraged young offenders to waive their legal 
rights. Furthermore, he observed that judges often implied to juvenile defendants that 
waiving rights would not have far-reaching consequences (as cited in National 
Juvenile Defender Center, 1995). Additionally, Grisso and Ring (1979) observed that 
when juvenile defendants were provided the opportunity to consult with a parent 
during a police interrogation, parents often encouraged their children to cooperate 
with authorities. Finally, research presented previously suggested that may have 
incomplete understanding of important scientific concepts, and are thus, unable to 
convey the concepts effectively to students, research suggests that even adults may 
have a limited understanding of the Miranda warnings (Grisso, 1981).Thus, adults 
may be unable to address youths’ misconceptions about legal rights adequately.    
 Third, adolescents’ misconceptions about their legal rights are reinforced by 
television and movies. Many youth receive their primary education about legal rights 
from popular culture. Thus, according to Freund (1977), youth manifest significant 
deficits in legal reasoning because popular culture tends to emphasize the “coercive 
function” over the “non-coercive function” of the law (p. 158).   In other words, 
adolescents learn that laws function primarily to sanction criminal behaviors and only 
secondarily to protect civil rights. In the police dramas and movies frequently 
watched by youth, the Miranda warnings are negatively connoted. Rarely are 
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criminal defendants portrayed as confidently asserting their rights. Rather, the 
Miranda warnings are characterized as the “loopholes” that guilty suspects use to “get 
off.” Alternatively, confessions are often positively connoted; suspects who confess 
are often portrayed as “doing the right thing.” 
  Enhancing legal reasoning requires conceptual change instruction. As 
adolescents’ misconceptions about the Miranda warnings are reinforced by personal 
experiences and observations, adult role models, and popular media, I hypothesize 
that these misconceptions are firmly entrenched in adolescents’ legal problem-solving 
frameworks. Thus, I assert that altering these frameworks and enhancing legal 
reasoning will require conceptual change instruction.  
First, I characterize the shift from a “waiver orientation” to an “assertion 
orientation” as “revolutionary.”  Arguably, the heuristics, “when personal safety is at 
risk, cooperation with authority is in my best interests,” “further harm may come to 
me if I refuse to cooperate with authority,” and “cooperating with authority is the 
right thing to do” are manifestations of youths’ ontological beliefs about the 
relationship between children and adults and the morality of confessions; these 
heuristics represent youths’ fundamental assumptions about how the world works. 
Indeed, Buss (2000) argued that that the child’s difficulty conceptualizing rights as 
entitlements stems in part from the child’s life experience; nothing in the child’s 
experience suggests that there may be situations in which his authority “eclipses” that 
of an adult’s (p. 247).   
Given this entrenched system of beliefs, I hypothesize that rights assertion 
carries a negative connotation for youth; youth assume that asserting rights will lead 
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to negative consequences for them and equate rights assertion with doing something 
wrong.  Thus, the shift from a “waiver orientation” to an “assertion orientation” 
requires a radical transformation, or conceptual change. 
Second, conceptual change instruction is consistent with Levine and Tapp’s 
(1977) recommendations for the development of legal curricula. The authors 
advocated for an active approach to legal education based on the principles of  
Piaget’s model of equilibration. According to the authors, legal curricula employing a 
conceptual change framework have two primary objectives. First, these curricula 
should increase students’ factual understanding of the law and legal processes.  
Second, the material presented in these curricula should provoke conflict within the 
child’s existing system of legal values.  
Furthermore, Levine and Tapp (1977) emphasized the importance of active 
participation in stimulating legal development. Specifically, the authors argued that 
providing students with opportunities for role taking (i.e., activities that require 
students to adopt perspectives that are contrary to their own) would serve to catalyze 
the process of equilibration, thereby maximizing the facilitative effects of cognitive 
conflict on legal development. Indeed, Kohlberg argued that exposure to alternative 
perspectives during role-taking opportunities served to force students to evaluate the 
adequacy of their own moral problem-solving frameworks (as cited in Crain, 1985). 
 Third, Chinn and Brewer (1993) argued that many students maintain 
misconceptions about the natural sciences because current instructional methods 
failed to utilize conceptual change strategies (e.g., activation of misconceptions, 
facilitation of cognitive conflict, enhancement of deep-level learning). Analogously, I 
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theorize that if legal curricula fail to utilize conceptual change strategies, students will 
continue to maintain misconceptions about the content, significance, and function of 
the Miranda warnings.    
Indeed, one study suggested that students continued to demonstrate 
misconceptions about the Miranda warnings after receiving didactic legal instruction. 
Wall and Furlong (1985) examined whether Streetlaw, a year long course designed to 
improve students’ understanding of legal processes and basic Constitutional rights, 
improved Miranda comprehension among 48 high school students in an urban 
Chicago high school. Although results indicated that the majority of students who 
completed the program gained a factual understanding of the Miranda warnings, 
students’ performances on the Miranda vocabulary and function of rights measures 
raised serious questions about the comprehensiveness and depth of their 
understanding. Specifically, on the Miranda vocabulary measure, most students gave 
inadequate definitions of one or more words. Furthermore, at post-test, students 
continued to underestimate the power and durability of their rights. Although the 
majority of students who completed the Streetlaw program reported that they could 
remain silent during interrogation, these students believed a judge could force them to 
offer self-incriminating information in court. Wall and Furlong hypothesized that 
students continued to manifest deficits in comprehension because the Streetlaw 
program failed to utilize the pedagogical strategies recommended by Levine and Tapp 
(1977) (e.g., facilitation of cognitive conflict, active role playing). 
 
Part III: Specification of Treatment 
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The Miranda Rights Educational Curriculum 
 In many respects, custodial interrogation provides the ideal context for 
conceptual change instruction. This situation requires youth to consider a course of 
action (e.g., asserting legal rights) that is potentially incongruent with existing beliefs 
(e.g., “It is important to comply with the police officer’s request;” “I have to do what 
the police officer says, or I’ll get in trouble;” “If I assert my rights, I’ll look guilty”).  
Youth will have to modify their extant rights frameworks to include more adaptive 
beliefs (e.g., “I cannot be punished for asserting my rights even if that means going 
against what the police are asking me to do;” “Asking to speak to a lawyer is nothing 
to be ashamed of-this is my Constitutional right”).  
In this section, I provide a brief overview of the curriculum and highlight how 
the curriculum is based on the model of conceptual change. 
Overview of the Curriculum 
The Miranda Rights Educational Curriculum is an interactive, experiential 
play of the police interrogation of a juvenile suspect. There are four primary “roles” 
in the play: the interrogating police officer, the assisting police officer, the narrator, 
and the primary suspect. 
The curriculum is divided into two sections. Section I provides students with a 
realistic account of a police interrogation. At the beginning of the play, the narrator 
informs the audience that there has been an armed robbery in a local park and asks the 
audience members to pretend that they are suspects in the crime. Next, the narrator 
introduces the audience to the police officers who have been assigned to the case. 
After explaining the details of the crime, the police officers inform students that they 
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suspect certain audience members may have information about the crime. Next, the 
officers select one student, a pre-trained confederate, from the audience and place the 
student “under arrest.” The police officer then proceeds to interrogate the suspect 
about the crime using common interrogation strategies (e.g., implication of leniency, 
implication of false evidence) from popular police training manuals, such as Inbau 
and Reid’s (2001) Criminal Interrogation and Confessions. After “interrogating” the 
suspect, the police officer tells the suspect that he must make an important decision: 
Either admit to his involvement in the crime or risk his future by refusing to 
cooperate. At this point the narrator “freezes” the interrogation.   
  Section II is comprised of five alternating discussion/didactic components. 
During the discussion components the narrator engages in conversations with the 
primary suspect about his thoughts and concerns regarding his current predicament, 
and actively involves the audience by encouraging questions and soliciting advice for 
the primary suspect. During the didactic components, the narrator provides the 
audience with accurate information about the content, significance, and function of 
the Miranda warnings and the interrogation process.  In general, the purpose of the 
discussion components is two-fold. First, these components serve to activate students’ 
misconceptions about the Miranda warnings. Second, by requiring students to 
provide justification for their responses, these components force students to evaluate 
the adequacy of these conceptions for solving the dilemma at hand. Alternatively, by 
introducing anomalous data, or accurate information about the Miranda warnings and 
the interrogation process, the purpose of the didactic components is to catalyze the 
equilibration process. 
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Strategies for Facilitating Conceptual Change 
 The primary objective of the curriculum is to facilitate a shift in students from 
a “waiver orientation” to an “assertion orientation.” Consistent with models of 
conceptual change instruction, the Miranda Rights Educational Curriculum includes 
the following core components: (a) activation of misconceptions, (b) presentation of 
the alternative “option”2, (c) presentation of anomalous data, and (d) enhancement of 
deep-level learning.  
Activation of Misconceptions 
  To activate students’ misconceptions about the content, significance, and 
function of the Miranda warnings, the curriculum employs two strategies. First, the 
curriculum provides students with a realistic simulation of a police interrogation. 
Given the coercive and intimidating nature of police interrogations, we theorize that 
the simulation of a realistic interrogation scenario will generate mild anxiety amongst 
the audience members, thereby eliciting the audience’s misconceptions about legal 
rights and the interrogation process.  To enhance the salience of the interrogation, the 
police officers randomly select students to fingerprint and photograph as they enter 
the auditorium. Furthermore, the police officers display pencil sketches of the 
“suspects” and inform the audience that these sketches are based on eye-witness 
accounts. These sketches will depict adolescents that could easily be members of the 
target audience. Third, the police officers use standard interrogation strategies (e.g., 
informing the suspect that cooperation is the right thing to do, implication of the 
existence of evidence against the suspect) from common police manuals.    
                                                 
2  Although conceptual change instruction models generally characterize this step as presentation of the 
alternative theory, we believe that “option” is a more accurate characterization of “rights assertion.” 
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Second, the discussion components explicitly address the common, research-
supported misconceptions of younger adolescents about the Miranda rights and the 
interrogation process. As students may be unaware of the misconceptions they hold, 
the primary function of the suspect will be to ensure that these misconceptions are 
raised.  
Discussion Component #1.  This component explicitly addresses the typical 
misconceptions of younger adolescents about the content and meaning of the 
Miranda rights. During this component, the narrator asks the suspect if he 
understands the right to remain silent. The suspect provides an explanation of the 
right that is incorrect, yet typical of younger adolescents. Specifically, the suspect 
states that the right to remain silent means, “If I’m innocent, I don’t have to talk to the 
police.”  
Discussion Component # 2.  This component addresses the misconceptions 
that are frequently held by younger adolescents regarding the concept of a “right.” 
During this component, the suspect reasons that because police officers are law 
enforcement officials, they have the power to bestow or revoke rights at their 
discretion.  
Discussion Component #3. This component addresses common 
misconceptions about the consequences of waiver versus non-waiver decisions. 
During this component, the suspect reasons that it is in his best interest to cooperate. 
He justifies his reasoning on the following premises: (a) During the interrogation, the 
police officer tells the suspect he has “proof” that the suspect is lying (i.e., he informs 
the suspect that two eyewitnesses reported that they saw the suspect in the vicinity of 
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the park on the afternoon of the crime). The suspect reasons that this is strong 
evidence against his and thus, refusal to cooperate will only make matters worse; (b) 
During the interrogation, the police officer states that cooperating is the “right thing 
to do.” The suspect assumes that police officers are sworn to tell the truth, and, 
therefore, are not allowed to mislead him. 
Discussion Component # 5. This component activates adolescents’ 
misconceptions about: (a) the long-term consequences of waiving rights, (b) whether 
rights can be asserted after the suspect has already answered some police questions, 
and (c) the fastest way to end a police interrogation. Despite his newly acquired 
knowledge of the Miranda warnings,  the suspect reasons that even if he decides to 
cooperate with the police now by discussing elements of the crime, the “truth” will 
come out later in court. In other words, the suspect asserts his assumption that 
cooperating with the police will not have far-reaching consequences. Furthermore, as 
he has already answered some of the officer’s questions, he reasons that it may be too 
late to assert his rights. Finally, he reasons that cooperating with the police will be the 
fastest way to end an extremely stressful and emotionally charged situation.   
Presentation of the Alternative Option  
During the first discussion component, the narrator asks the audience what the 
suspect’s best alternative is. If students do not mention rights assertion as a possible 
course of action for the suspect, the narrator will suggest it as another alternative to be 
weighed and evaluated. Evidence supporting “rights assertion” as the suspect’s best 
possible option and detailing the positive consequences of rights assertion will be 
presented during the didactic components.  
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Presentation of Anomalous Data 
Information provided during the didactic components is intended to directly 
contradict the common misconceptions elicited during the discussion components. 
Furthermore, this information is intended to increase students’ dissatisfaction with 
their current legal problem-solving frameworks and to increase the evidentiary 
support for the alternative option (i.e., rights assertion).   
Didactic Component #1. During the first didactic component, the narrator 
provides the audience with simplified explanations of each Miranda warning. 
Furthermore, the narrator explains to the audience that rights are universal (i.e., rights 
apply to everyone whether guilty or innocent, whether a child or an adult).  
Didactic Component # 2. During the second component, the narrator informs 
students that the Miranda warnings are based on amendments from the Constitution. 
The narrator provides a brief, historical context for the Miranda warnings and 
discusses how these rights form the foundation of the American criminal justice 
system. This will lend credibility to the alternative option. 
Didactic Component # 3. During the third didactic component, the narrator 
will “unfreeze” the police officer to ask him about the objectives of interrogations. 
The police officer informs students that his job is to “keep criminals off the street.” 
As confessions are powerful pieces of evidence that can be used to convict suspects 
of a crime, his primary objective during an interrogation is to elicit a confession from 
a suspect he believes is guilty. The officer explicitly acknowledges that it is to his 
benefit, not the suspect’s, for the suspect to cooperate. Furthermore, during this 
component, the narrator provides students with a list of common strategies that the 
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police employ during interrogations. The narrator will also educate students about 
rights violations by providing a list of activities that are prohibited during an 
interrogation (e.g., the use physical force). 
Didactic Component #5: Finally, during the fifth component, the narrator 
addresses the suspect’s misconceptions that if he cooperates with the police now, the 
“truth” will come out later in court. The narrator informs students that the fastest way 
to end a stressful police interrogation is to ask to speak with an attorney. The narrator 
also informs students that suspects can ask to speak to an attorney at any time from 
the moment of arrest, to after questioning has already begun. 
Enhancing Deep-Level Learning 
 Consistent with Chinn and Brewer’s (1993), Enwhistle’s (2000) and 
Brophy’s (2004) recommendations for facilitating deep-level learning, the Miranda 
Rights Educational Curriculum requires students to justify their responses during the 
discussion components and encourages active participation by the audience.  
Furthermore, several strategies are used to increase the personal salience of the 
curriculum. First, a well-liked student from the school, pre-chosen by faculty and 
staff, is used to portray the role of the suspect. Second, students are told that the crime 
occurred in a local park and that the victim is same-aged peer from a specific, 
neighboring school. Third, the police officer uses strategies that bare personal 
relevance to youth (e.g., refusing to cooperate will disappoint friends and parents, 
refusal to cooperate will prevent youth from obtaining life-long goals such as 
completing high school or going to college). 
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Furthermore, the curriculum includes a “reflective activity.” Davis (2004) 
argued that to facilitate cognitive accommodation, teachers should provide students 
with “time to reflect on and reconcile differences between their conceptions and the 
target theory” (p. 11). She further argued that teachers should incorporate “reflective 
activities” into lessons that are designed to reinforce key components of the theory.   
The purpose of the fourth didactic/discussion component is to reinforce key 
aspects about the content, significance, and function of the Miranda warnings.  At 
this stage of the curriculum, many students will have gained a basic understanding of 
the content of the Miranda warnings and how these warnings function in the context 
of a police interrogation. However, we theorize that despite this increase in factual 
understanding, many students will continue to struggle with the decision to assert 
rights. We attribute this “struggle” to the fact that the decision to assert rights 
contradicts students’ ontological beliefs about the relationship between children and 
adults and the morality of confessions. These beliefs include: (a) “When personal 
safety is at risk, cooperation with authority is in my best interests;” (b) “Further harm 
may come to me if I refuse to cooperate with authority;” and (c) “Doing ‘the right 
thing’ requires cooperating with authority.” Given this entrenched system of beliefs, 
rights assertion will continue to carry a negative connotation for many students; youth 
may assume that asserting rights will lead to negative consequences for them and 
equate rights assertion with doing something wrong. 
To challenge these beliefs, the narrator will ask students to imagine living in a 
country in which criminal suspects did not have these rights. The narrator will ask the 
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audience to speculate about what could happen to suspects during a police 
interrogation if these rights were not safeguarded.  
Thus, the rationale for the fourth component is two-fold. First, students will 
learn that the primary function of these warnings is not to obscure the truth (i.e., by 
providing guilty suspects with a way to “get off”). Rather, these rights serve to 
protect the truth (i.e., by ensuring that confessions are not merely the fruits of 
coercion, by protecting suspects from cruel and unusual interrogation procedures). 
Second, students will learn that these rights serve to protect the suspect from harm 
(i.e., by the limiting scope of strategies police can employ to elicit confessions).  
Method 
The Current Study 
In conclusion, we argue that the development of legal reasoning involves both 
quantitative changes in the individual’s repertoire of legal facts, as well as qualitative 
changes in the individual’s legal, problem-solving framework. Importantly, we did 
not wish to suggest that students who completed an hour-long educational program 
would become advanced legal reasoners, prepared to deal with whatever complex 
legal dilemmas they might encounter. As previously discussed, physical and social 
maturation during adolescence play critical roles in the development of legal 
reasoning. Indeed Turiel (1974) noted that the progression of abstract reasoning 
requires exposure to diverse perspectives and experiences. Thus, transition to the 
higher stages of reasoning often does not occur until late adolescence, a time 
characterized by greater exposure to, and participation in, autonomous experiences3. 
                                                 
3 Notably, Rachel Kalbeitzer addressed the roles of social and physical maturation in the progression of 
legal reasoning in her dissertation as a second part to the proposed study. 
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Furthermore, we did not wish to suggest that the curriculum would stimulate radical 
changes in judgment that would manifest in various decision-making contexts. 
Rather, one purpose of the current study was to determine whether or not the 
curriculum could stimulate some change in students’ valuation of and beliefs about 
the efficacy of rights; a purpose of the current study was to consider the role of 
cognitive conflict as one potential factor mediating the development of legal 
reasoning.  
Hypotheses 
The primary objective of this study was to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
Miranda Rights Educational Curriculum for youth ages 10 through 16. This study 
also considered whether youths’ comprehension of and capacity to reason about the 
Miranda warnings improved differentially across age groups.  
Furthermore, this study investigated the effect of age on legal learning. In general, 
we expected that levels of comprehension and appreciation of rights would vary 
differentially across age groups with 15 and 16 year olds achieving the highest scores 
at pre- and post-test, and 10 to 12 year olds achieving the lowest scores at pre- and 
post-test.  Based on research, we predicted that 10 to12 year olds would have the 
lowest initial scores of all the age groups and, therefore, would have the greatest room 
for improvement (Grisso, 1981; Grisso et al., 2003). Thus, we hypothesized that 10 to 
12 year olds would display the greatest quantitative increases in comprehension and 
factual understanding, followed by the 13 and 14 year olds, followed by the 15 and 16 
year olds. However, as 15 and 16 year olds are psychosocially (e.g., Grisso et al., 
2003) and cognitively (e.g., Scott & Grisso, 2004) more advanced, we hypothesized 
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this age group would be more likely to display improvements in the appreciation and 
valuation of the Miranda warnings. Thus, we hypothesized that 15 and 16 year olds 
would display the greatest improvements in appreciation of the Miranda rights as 
well as the capacity to recognize and assess the severity of potential, long-term risks 
of waiver/assertion decisions, followed by the 13 and 14 year olds, followed by the 10 
to 12 year olds.  
Participants 
 Participants were 64 students (26 boys, 38 girls) ages 10 through 16, from 
grades 5 through 10, at a private, co-educational, college preparatory school in the 
Mid-Atlantic region. The majority of participants were Caucasian (85.9%), followed 
by African American and Asian (both 4.7%), and other ethnicity (1.2%).  The average 
Verbal IQ score for the entire sample was in the Superior Range, (M=119.5; 
SD=11.47; range 90-143), with no significant differences in IQ scores across age 
groups, F (2, 57) = 2.60, p =.083 (10 to 12 year olds, M=116.0, SD=11.57; 13 and 14 
year olds, M=123.5, SD=10.71; and 15 and 16 year olds M=118.1, SD=11.47). Four 
students were absent the day of the assembly (one 12 year old, two 14 year olds, and 
one 15 year old); therefore, these students did not complete the post-test assessment 
battery.  
For the purposes of data evaluation, participants were classified into three groups 
based on age: 10 to 12 year olds, 13 and 14 year olds, and 15 and 16 year-olds. This 
age-based classification structure is consistent with previous research investigating 
youths’ Miranda comprehension (Grisso, 1981) and legal decision-making capacities 
(Grisso et al., 2003).  
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Measures 
Miranda Rights Comprehension Instruments – II (MRCI-II) (Goldstein, Condie, 
& Grisso, in preparation).  An updated version of Grisso’s (1998) Instruments for 
Assessing Understanding and Appreciation of Miranda Rights, the MRCI-II are used 
to assess the examinee’s knowledge, understanding, and appreciation of the Miranda 
warnings. Originally developed for research purposes, the Instruments for Assessing 
Understanding and Appreciation of Miranda Rights (Grisso, 1998) have been widely 
used in clinical contexts to evaluate defendants’ capacities to waive their Miranda 
rights (Grisso, 1998). The revised instruments reflect the following changes: First, the 
language used in the instruments has been updated to reflect the current version of the 
Miranda warning commonly used in jurisdictions across the United States. Notably, 
the language used in the original instruments reflected the 1970’s version of the 
Miranda warning. Second, a fifth Miranda prong was added to the revised 
instruments. This prong states that a suspect may stop questioning at any time to 
request an attorney (Oberlander, 1998). When the original instruments were 
developed, a typical Miranda warning contained four prongs. Third, a fifth 
instrument, Perceptions of Coercion during the Holding and Interrogation Process 
(P-CHIP), has been added to examine a juvenile’s self-reported likelihood of offering 
a false confession in response to police interrogation strategies4. 
 The MRCI-II is comprised of the following, five instruments: 
(1) Comprehension of Miranda Rights-II (CMR-II). This instrument assesses 
adolescents’ understanding of the standard Miranda warning. The examiner reads 
                                                 
4 Notably, this measure was primarily used to address a separate research question (in a proposed study 
by Heather Kestner Green).  
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each warning aloud and asks the examinee to explain the warning in his own words. 
Scores on the CMR-II range from 0 to 10 points. Responses are scored according to 
standardized criteria to determine if the adolescent’s responses are adequate (score of 
2), questionable (score of 1), or inadequate (score of 0).  
(2) Comprehension of Miranda Rights-Recognition-II (CMR-R-II). This 
instrument asks the examinee to identify statements as semantically the same or 
different from each Miranda warning. This instrument assesses the adolescent’s 
understanding of the Miranda rights without reliance on verbal expressive abilities. 
Scores on the CMR-R-II range from 0 to 15.  Correct responses are awarded 1 point 
each. Incorrect responses are awarded 0 points. 
(3) Function of Rights in Interrogation (FRI).  This instrument uses 
hypothetical vignettes to assess the examinee’s perception of the function and 
significance of the Miranda warnings within the context of legal proceedings. The 
examinee is presented with four pictures that depict scenarios commonly experienced 
by criminal defendants. The examiner reads four hypothetical vignettes which 
correspond to the pictures. The examinee is asked 15 standardized questions to assess 
appreciation of the warnings across three subscales: (1) Nature of Interrogation 
Subscale (NI) (i.e., assesses the examinee’s perceptions of the role of the police and 
the suspect in interrogation), (2) the Right to Counsel Subscale (RC) (i.e., assesses the 
adolescent’s perception of the role of the attorney in legal proceedings), and  (3) 
Right to Silence Subscale (RS) (i.e., assesses the adolescent’s perception of the 
significance of the right to silence and the degree to which this right limits the 
discretionary power of legal authorities. Responses are scored 0 (inadequate 
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response), 1 (questionable response), or 2 (adequate response), with a possible total 
score ranging from 0 to 30.  
(4) Comprehension of Miranda Vocabulary-II (CMV-II). The CMV-II assesses 
the examinee’s understanding of specific words in the Miranda warning (e.g., silence, 
attorney, interrogation). The examiner states the word, uses the word in a sentence, 
and states the word again. The examinee is then asked to give the meaning of each 
word. Responses are scored as adequate (score of 2), questionable (score of 1), or 
inadequate (score if 0). Total scores range from 0 to 36. 
(5) Perceptions of Coercion during the Holding and Interrogation Processes 
(P-Chip). This instrument assesses the examinees’ self-reported likelihood of offering 
a false confession during interrogation. The examiner reads a hypothetical vignette to 
the examinee about a boy who reports that he was mugged by an individual of the 
examinee’s age and gender; the examinee is then asked to pretend he is the juvenile in 
the story. Next, the examiner adds hypothetical information about police interrogation 
behaviors to the original scenario. These hypothetical police behaviors are based on 
interrogation tactics outlined in popular police training manuals. Following each 
hypothetical scenario, the examiner asks the examinee to rate the suspect’s stress 
level and the likelihood that the suspect will offer a confession if he is either guilty or 
not guilty of a crime. Specifically, the P-CHIP is comprised of 3 subscales: 
a. Subscale 1 (True Confessions): This subscale is designed to assess the 
examinee’s self-predicted response to the police if the suspect is guilty of 
the crime. Three options are provided: say nothing to the police (score of 
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2), talk to police but not about the crime (score of 1), or talk to the police 
about the crime (score of 0). Total scores range from 0 to 52. 
b. Subscale 2 (Stress): This subscale is designed to assess the examinee’s 
self-predicted stress level to the 26 hypothetical interrogation practices of 
the police. Stress level is measured on a scale of 1 (very relaxed) to 6 
(very stressed). Total scores range from 26 to 156. 
c. Subscale 3 (False Confessions): This subscale assesses the examinee’s 
self-reported likelihood of offering false confessions in response to series 
of hypothetical police interrogation tactics. Scores from each item range 
from (1 will definitely not offer a false confession) to 6 (will definitely 
offer a false confession). Total scores range from 26 to 56. 
Test-retest reliability was established for each of the MRCI-II instruments 
(Goldstein, Condie, Kalbeitzer, Mesiarik, & Grisso, in preparation). Test-retest 
reliability for each component of the MRCI-II  instruments was as follows: (a) CMR-
II (r = .61, p < .01); (b) CMR-R-II (r = .75, p < .01); (c) FRI (r = .58, p < .01); (d) 
CMV-II (r = .77, p < .01); (e) P-CHIP, Part A (r = .76, p  < .01); (f) P-CHIP, Part B (r 
= .71, p < .01); and (g) P-CHIP, Part C (r = .77, p < .01) (Goldstein, Condie, 
Kalbeitzer, Mesiarik, & Grisso, in preparation). 
Goldstein and colleagues (in preparation) established inter-rater reliability for 
the CMR-II, CMV-II, and FRI. Interclass correlation (ICC) was used to measure inter-
rater reliability for each of the instruments. The Kappa coefficient reflects the amount 
of agreement obtained after removing the amount of agreement expected to occur by 
chance. Specifically, for the CMR-II, an ICC of .97 was obtained, and the average 
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Kappa coefficient for the individual CMR-II items was .95. For the CMV-II, an ICC 
of .98 was obtained, and the average Kappa coefficient for the CMV-II items was .93. 
For the FRI, an ICC of .99 was obtained, and the average Kappa coefficients for the 
individual FRI items was .98. 
Goldstein and colleagues (in preparation) established content validity on the 
basis that the wording used and scenarios depicted in the instrument parallels 
common versions of the Miranda warnings used throughout the country and common 
police interrogation situations. Furthermore, Goldstein, and colleagues (2003) 
established construct validity by the examining relationship between Miranda 
comprehension and intelligence and age. Regression analyses indicated that Verbal 
IQ and age independently predicted Miranda comprehension (bage = .07, SEage = .02, 
p < .01; bVIQ = .01, SEVIQ = .002, p < .01) (Goldstein, Condie, et al., 2003).  
Judgment in Legal Contexts Instrument (JILC; Woolard, Repucci, Steinberg, 
Grisso, & Scott, 2003).  Developed specifically for the MacArthur Juvenile 
Adjudicative Competence Study, the JILC is intended to assess decision making in 
the context of three legal circumstances that commonly face criminal defendants (i.e., 
police interrogation, consultation with an attorney, and plea negotiation). This 
instrument has two objectives: (a) to assess examinees’ choices in three legal decision 
contexts often facing defendants, and (b) to identify and examine their explanations 
for those choices according to several dimensions of psychosocial maturity (Woolard, 
2003).  
 The examiner reads three vignettes to the examinee describing: (a) a police 
interrogation, (b) consultation with an attorney, and (c) plea negotiation. Only the 
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police interrogation vignette was used in this study. In the police interrogation 
vignette, a suspect is questioned by the police. The suspect is described as having 
been a lookout for others during a crime. The police officers ask the suspect to waive 
the right to silence. After presenting the vignette, the examinee is asked to 
recommend the best and worst course of action for the defendant from a list of three 
possible responses (confessing to the offense, denying the offense, and refusing to 
speak).  
 The examinee’s reasons for the “best” and “worst” choices for the suspect are 
then scored according to three variables associated with the construct of psychosocial 
maturity: risk orientation, future orientation, and resistance to peer influence. As 
previously argued, resistance to peer influence may not be directly relevant to the 
decisions adolescents make about whether or not to waive their Miranda rights. Thus, 
this variable was not included in the present study5.  
 In general, Risk Orientation assesses the examinee’s ability to identify 
potential risks and to assess the likelihood that those risks will occur. Participants are 
asked to identify all positive and negative consequences of each best and worst choice 
recommendation, and the unpleasantness of those risks.  Risk Orientation is 
comprised of two variables Risk Recognition and Risk Appraisal. 
 Risk Recognition is based on questions about the best and worst choices in 
each vignette. Participants are to identify the potential positive and negative 
                                                 
5 In general, while each vignette yields future recognition, risk recognition, and risk appraisal scores, 
total scores for these variables are calculated by averaging the individual scores across the three 
vignettes. As we were only concerned with assessing participants’ legal decision making skills during 
a police interrogation and, thus, only administered the police interrogation vignette, total scores for 
these variables could not be calculated. Rather, future recognition, risk recognition, and risk appraisal 
scores solely reflected the participants’ responses to the police interrogation vignette. 
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consequences of each best and worst choice. The “Risk Recognition 1” score (R-
Rec1) represents the total number of risks identified for the examinee’s best and 
worst choice for the defendant in the vignette. The “Risk Recognition 2” score (R-
Rec2) represents the percentage of a person’s total consequences (both positive and 
negative) that were negative. Higher R-Rec1 and R-Rec2 scores indicate greater 
recognition of potential risks in legally relevant situations.  
Risk Appraisal is comprised of two scores: the “Risk Appraisal 1” score (R-
App1) and the “Risk Appraisal 2” score (R-App2). The R-App1 score indicates the 
examinee’s self-reported likelihood that potentially negative consequences will occur. 
Responses are scored according to a 4 point scale, “anchored by the positive outcome 
definitely happening (1 pt) and the negative outcome definitely happening (4 pts)” 
(Woolard, 2003 p. 12).  
 The R-App2 score measures the examinee’s rating of how unpleasant 
negative consequences would be if they did occur. To rate the unpleasantness of 
negative consequences, examinees use a four point scale, ranging from “okay” (1 pt.) 
to “very bad” (4 pts). 
Future Orientation is assessed by coding all of the risks identified by each 
participant as reflecting the short- or long-range nature of their consequences. Future 
Orientation is comprised of 3 variables, “Future Recognition 1” score (F-Rec1), 
“Future Recognition 2” score (F-Rec2), and “Future Recognition 3” score (F-Rec3). 
Using the examinee’s best and worst choices responses, the examiner asks the 
examinee to list the potential positive and negative consequences of those choices. 
The F-Rec1 score represents the total number of long-term consequences (defined as 
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consequences that would occur several days after the choice was made) identified for 
both the best and worst choices in the vignette. The F-Rec2 score represents the 
percentage of a examinees total consequences (short- and long-term) that are long 
term consequences.   
To obtain the F-Rec3 score, participants are asked to provide the main reason 
why their best choice is better than their worst choice for the vignette. This reason is 
codified as reflecting short or long-term consequences.  
 Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI; Psychological 
Corporation, 1999). The WASI is a standardized measure of intellectual functioning 
(The Psychological Corporation, 1999). Although the WASI measures both Verbal IQ 
and Performance IQ, as verbal skills are of primary relevance to Miranda 
comprehension, only the verbal subtests were administered: (a) Vocabulary (i.e., 
measures an individual’s expressive vocabulary and verbal knowledge), and (b) 
Similarities (i.e., measures an individual’s conceptual verbal understanding, abstract 
reasoning ability, and general intellectual ability) (The Psychological Corporation, 
1999).  
Interrater reliability of the WASI verbal scales is excellent: Vocabulary, r = 
.98; Similarities, r = .99 (The Psychological Corporation, 1999). Test-retest reliability 
of the WASI Verbal IQ is also excellent (r = .92) (The Psychological Corporation, 
1999).  
Content validity was established using verbal IQ scores from the WASI, the 
Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children – Third Edition (WISC-III) (The 
Psychological Corporation, 1991) and the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – Third 
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Edition (WAIS-III) (The Psychological Corporation, 1997). Correlations between 
WASI Verbal IQ and Verbal IQ from these instruments were, r = .82 and r= .88, 
respectively (The Psychological Corporation, 1999) 
The Psychological Corporation (1999) established construct validity by 
calculating correlations between the individual WASI subtests and the general IQ 
scales. Correlations between the Similarities and Vocabulary subsections were high (r 
= .75). Additionally, correlations between Verbal IQ score and the Similarities scaled 
score and between the Verbal IQ scores and Vocabulary scaled score were also high, 
r = .93 and r = .94 respectively. 
Miranda Rights Misconceptions Inventory (MRMI). The MRMI is an eight-
item, true-false questionnaire assessing common misconceptions about the Miranda 
rights and the interrogation procedure. This instrument primarily served as a fidelity 
check to ensure that participants acquired certain basic concepts (e.g., that defendants 
can end interrogations by requesting a lawyer, that the Miranda rights apply to both 
adult and child defendants, etc.) As the inventory was created specifically for this 
study, no psychometric information can be provided. 
Demographic Questionnaire. Participants were asked to provide information 
about age, race, and the source of any previous exposure to the Miranda warnings 
(e.g., television, movies, parents, etc.).  
Measures Administered but Not Used in the Proposed Study. In addition to the 
measures described in this section, participants were administered the Gudjonsson 
Suggestibility Scale (GSS) which measures an individual’s susceptibility to 
suggestion and interrogative pressure. However, as these measures were used to 
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address a separate research question (in a proposed study by Heather Kestner Green), 
we did not discuss the instrument here in detail.  
Procedures 
 IRB approval was obtained for this study prior to implementing the following 
procedures. We conducted two school assemblies, one for the 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th 
graders, and one for the 9th and 10th graders. For each assembly, the role of the 
“suspect” was played by a pre-selected student from the target audience. At each 
assembly, information provided about the ages of the suspects and victim was varied 
to correspond with the mean age of the target audience. Although the same person 
performed the role of the narrator in both assemblies, due to scheduling conflicts, 
different individuals performed the role of the police officer in the middle and upper 
school assemblies.  The individuals who performed in the assemblies did not 
administer pre- or post- assessments.  
Participants were recruited in the following ways: (1) Project staff provided 
information about the project to interested parents at Middle and Upper School-
sponsored events (e.g., parent/teacher meetings, sporting events, musical events, other 
extracurricular activities that parents attend); and (2) Teachers informed students 
about the possibility of participating in the study and provided them with an 
informational letter to take home to parents, which is the standard, school procedure 
for relaying information to parents. Parents contacted project staff if they were 
interested in having their child participate. Parental consent and youth assent were 
required for students to participate in the study. 
                                                                   Miranda Rights Educational Curriculum
    
69
This research project is divided into two primary studies. The current study, 
examining the short-term efficacy of the Miranda Rights Educational Curriculum, 
had two assessment periods, one prior to the educational assembly and one after the 
assembly. A follow-up assessment was conducted one year later, as part of the second 
study, to examine the longer-term efficacy of the curriculum and the impact of 
maturation on Miranda comprehension and legal decision-making skills.  
For the pre-assembly assessment, students were individually tested anywhere 
from three weeks to one-day prior to the assembly. The pre-test evaluation lasted 
approximately 135 minutes. The following instruments were administered in the 
following order: (1) MRCI-II, (2) WASI, (3) JILC, (4) Miranda Rights Misconceptions 
Inventory, and (5) demographic questionnaire. The demographic questionnaire and 
the Miranda Rights Misconceptions Inventory were administered at the end of the 
battery to avoid familiarizing participants with the Miranda rights prior to their 
completing the MRCI-II and the JILC.  
 For the post-assembly assessment, students were individually tested anywhere 
from one-day to three weeks after the assembly. Each evaluation lasted approximately 
90 minutes. The following instruments were administered in this order: (1) MRCI-II, 
(2) JILC, and (3) Miranda Rights Misconceptions Inventory.  
Per the suggestion of the school administration, participants were evaluated 
during school hours (during study halls, lunch periods, and designated class-times), 
and after school.  
Undergraduate and graduate research assistants were trained in the 
administration and scoring of each of the instruments. Research assistants were 
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required to attend four training workshops and to demonstrate inter-rater reliability on 
all assessment tools. All assessments were scored independently by two raters. To 
limit the effects of experimenter bias, assessments were not scored by the primary 
investigators,   
Results 
 
Data Analysis 
 Univariate analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were used to evaluate the 
relationships between age and each dependent variable [i.e., overall Miranda 
comprehension (measured by Overall Miranda Comprehension score6), appreciation 
of rights (measured by Function of Rights in Interrogation score), factual 
understanding of rights (measured by Factual Understanding score7), identification of 
long-range consequences of waiver/assertion decisions (measured by Future 
Recognition score), identification of potential risks of waiver/assertion decisions 
(measured by Risk Recognition score), and appraisal of risk severity (measured by 
Risk Appraisal score)] at pre-test, with age group as the between subjects factor. 
These analyses allowed us to compare results of the current study with results from 
                                                 
6 Overall Miranda Comprehension score is a weighted average of the CMR-II, CMR-R-II, and FRI 
scores, the instruments that focus most globally on understanding of Miranda rights. Although it is not 
recommended to aggregate these scores for clinical use, the scores may be combined for research 
purposes (Goldstein, Condie, et al., 2003). 
 
7 Factual Understanding score is a weighted average of the CMR-II, CMR-R-II, and CMV-II.  The 
Factual Understanding score differs from the Overall Miranda Comprehension score in that youth’s 
Overall Miranda Comprehension scores include the FRI, which measures youths’ appreciation of the 
Miranda rights, as well as general factual knowledge about rights. Thus, while the Overall Miranda 
Comprehension score captures a youth’s understanding of the content and application of the rights in a 
more holistic, conceptual sense, understanding scores primarily reflect the youth’s factual knowledge 
of the Miranda rights. This distinction is important for our purposes, as we expected that, although 
younger adolescents would gain factual knowledge from the curriculum, gains in appreciation of the 
Miranda warnings would be more limited. 
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previous studies investigating the relationships between age, Miranda 
comprehension, and the decision to waive or assert rights (e.g, Grisso, 1981). 
 A series of 3 x 2 repeated measures ANOVAs were used to evaluate changes 
in each dependent variable as a result of the curriculum. In each analysis, age group 
served as the between subjects factor, and time (pre- and post-test) served as the 
within subjects factor. Additionally, effects sizes (Cohen’s d; Cohen, 1988) were 
calculated for all analyses.  
 Finally, descriptive analyses were performed on individual items from the 
MRCI-II to (a) identify relative strengths and weaknesses of the curriculum, (b) 
identify common areas of misunderstanding for the participants, and (c) compare the 
performance of our participants on specific items of the MRCI-II to the performance 
of participants from previous studies (i.e., Grisso, 1981; Goldstein et al., 2003) on 
these same items. 
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Results for the Miranda Rights Comprehension Instruments - II (MRCI-II) 
 
 
 
Table 1: Mean Scores and Standard Deviations for the MRCI-II by Age at Pre- and Post-test 
 
  10-12 year olds 13 & 14 year olds 15 & 16 year olds 
  Pre (N=20) Post (19) Pre (24) Post (22) Pre (19) Post (18) 
Comprehension 
(CMR-II) 
 
 
5.63 
(SD=2.89) 
8.63 
(1.71) 
8.29 
(1.76) 
9.5 
(.51) 
8.95 
(1.13) 
9.72 
(.75) 
Recognition  
(CMR-R-II) 
 
 
10.53 
(2.89) 
12.05 
(1.13) 
13.13 
(1.45) 
13.23 
(.87) 
12.89 
(1.24) 
13.22 
(1.11) 
Function of Rights 
in Interrogation 
(FRI) 
 
21.16 
(3.71) 
24.26 
(3.86) 
23.71 
(3.26) 
25.91 
(2.86) 
25.5 
(2.88) 
26.72 
(2.47) 
Vocabulary 
 (CMV-II)  
 
24.58 
(5.33) 
29.22 
(4.73) 
31.42 
(2.63) 
31.91 
(2.87) 
32.68 
(2.06) 
32.89 
(2.42) 
Factual 
Understanding 
Score 
1.29 
(.31) 
1.66 
(.18) 
1.72 
(16) 
1.81 
(.05) 
1.77 
(09) 
1.84 
(.10) 
 
Overall Miranda 
Comprehension 
Score 
1.30 
(.31) 
1.65 
(.19) 
1.66 
(.17) 
1.80 
(.08) 
1.72 
(.11) 
1.83 
(.11) 
 
       
 
  
Table 2: Effect Sizes for Changes in the  MRCI-II by Age  
 
 10-12 yr olds 13 & 14 yr olds 15 & 16 yr olds 
CMR-II 
 
1.3 1.1 .82 
 CMR-R-II 
 
.76 .10 .28 
 FRI 
 
.82 .73 .45 
CMV-II  
 
.92 .18 .02 
Factual 
Understanding 
Score 
1.5 .9 .78 
Overall Miranda 
Comprehension 
Score 
1.4 1.08 1.0 
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 Overall Miranda comprehension (Overall Miranda Comprehension score). At 
pre-test, younger youth displayed lower Overall Miranda Comprehension scores than 
did older youth, F (2, 62) = 23.26, p < .001. Post-hoc comparisons indicated that 10 
to12 year olds had significantly lower Overall Miranda Comprehension scores than 
did either the 13 and 14 or 15 and 16 year olds. Although 13 and 14 year olds had 
lower Overall Miranda Comprehension Scores than 15 and 16 year olds, the 
difference between the two age groups was not significant (see Table 1). 
 As illustrated in Figure 1, from pre- to post-test, each age group demonstrated 
improvement in overall Miranda comprehension. Consistent with the prediction that 
overall Miranda comprehension would improve as a result of the curriculum and that 
these improvements would vary by age, a repeated measures ANOVA revealed a 
main effect of time, F (1, 56) = 72.01, p < .001. As expected, the repeated measures 
ANOVA also revealed a main effect of age, F (1, 56) = 6724.70, p < .001, and a 
significant time by age interaction F (2, 56) = 10.86, p < .01.  The effect sizes of 
change from pre- to post test were 1.4 (very large) for the 10 to 12 year olds, 1.08 
(large) for the 13 and 14 year olds, and 1.0 (large) for the 15 and 16 year olds (see 
Table 2). 
Post-hoc comparisons indicated that, on average, 10 to 12 year olds displayed 
significantly more improvement than did either the 13 and 14 or 15 and 16 year olds. 
Despite larger gains, however, their mean Overall Miranda Comprehension score at 
post-test remained lower than the mean Overall Miranda Comprehension scores of 
both the 13 and 14 and 15 and 16 year olds at pre-test.  
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          Figure 1. Improvements in Overall Miranda Comprehension Scores by Age 
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Appreciation of Miranda rights (Function of Rights in Interrogation score). 
At pre-test, younger youth demonstrated less appreciation of the Miranda rights, F (2, 
62) = 9.14, p < .001.  Post-hoc comparisons indicated that, on average, 10 to 12 year 
olds displayed significantly lower FRI scores than did either the 13 and 14 or 15 and 
16 year olds. Although the 13 and 14 year olds scored an average of 1.79 points lower 
than the 15 and 16 year olds, the difference was not significant (see Table 1).  
  As illustrated in Figure 2, from pre- to post-test, each age group demonstrated 
improvement in appreciation scores. The repeated measures ANOVA revealed main 
effects of time, F (1, 56) = 22.52, p < .001, and age, F (2, 56) = 8.35, p = .001, but no 
significant time by age interaction, F (2, 56) = 1.81, p = .173.  Effect sizes of change 
from pre- to post test were .82 (large) for the 10 to 12 year olds, .73(medium) for the 
13 and 14 year olds, and .45 (small) for the 15 and 16 year olds.  
Although 10 to 12 year olds displayed the greatest improvement from pre- to 
post-test, they continued to score lower than did either 13 and 14 or 15 and 16 year 
olds at post-test (see Figure 2).  
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                              Figure 2. Improvements in FRI Scores by Age 
 
 Factual understanding of Miranda rights (Factual Understanding score). At 
pre-test, younger youth displayed poorer factual understanding of rights than did 
older youth, F (2, 60) = 33.00, p < .001. Post-hoc comparisons indicated that, on 
average, the 10 to12 year olds demonstrated significantly poorer factual 
understanding than did either the 13- and 14- or 15- and 16-year-old youth. Although 
the 13 and 14 year olds displayed poorer Factual Understanding scores than the 15 
and 16 year olds, the difference was not significant (see Table 1).   
 Consistent with the prediction that factual understanding of Miranda rights 
would improve as a result of the curriculum and that these improvements would vary 
by age, the repeated measures ANOVA revealed main effects of time, F (1, 56) = 
55.65, p < .001, and age, F (2, 56) = 28.19, p = .001, and a significant time by age 
interaction, F (2, 56) = 13.92, p < .001. Effect sizes of change from pre- to post-test 
were 1.5 (very large) for the 10 to 12 year olds, .9 (large) for the 13 and 14 year olds, 
and .8 (large) for the 15 and 16 year olds (see Table 2).  
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 Post-hoc comparisons indicated that, on average, 10 to 12 year olds displayed 
significantly greater improvement in factual understanding than did either the 13 and 
14 or 15 and 16 year olds. Despite significantly greater gains, on average, 10 to 12 
year olds continued to score lower than either the 13 or 14 year olds or 15 and 16 year 
olds at pre-test (see Figure 3). 
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Figure 3. Improvements in Factual Understanding Scores by Age 
 
 
Results for Specific MRCI-II Instruments  
 CMR-II. On the CMR-II, a repeated measures ANOVA revealed a main effect 
of time, F (1, 57) = 51.26, p = .001, and age, F (2, 57) = 13.80, p < .001, and a 
significant time by age interaction, F (2, 57) = 7.81, p =. 001. Effect sizes of change 
from pre- to post-test were 1.3 (very large) for 10 to 12 year olds, 1.1 (very large) for 
the 13 and 14 year olds, and .82 (large) for 15 and 16 year olds (see Table 2). 
  Post-hoc comparisons revealed that, on average, 10 to 12 year olds 
demonstrated significantly greater improvement in their abilities to paraphrase each 
Miranda right than did either the 13 and 14 or 15 and 16 year olds. Despite 
                                                                   Miranda Rights Educational Curriculum
    
78
significantly greater gains, on average, 10 to 12 year olds continued to score lower 
than either the 13 or 14 or 15 and 16 year olds at pre-test (see Figure 4). 
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Figure 4. Improvements in CMR-II Scores by Age 
 
The percentage of youth earning perfect scores (Grisso’s absolute standard of 
Miranda comprehension) on all items of the Miranda warning more than doubled 
(from 26.6% to 58.3%). The percentage of youth earning perfect scores on items I 
through IV 8 increased from 34.4% to 60.0%; thus, the percentage of youth in the 
current study who earned perfect scores on items I through IV on the CMR-II at post-
test, surpassed the percentage of adults who earned perfect scores on the same 
instrument in Grisso’s (1981) study (60% versus 42.3%) (see Table 3)9.  
                                                 
8 When Grisso investigated youths’ and adults’ understanding of the Miranda rights in 1981, there 
were only four prongs to the Miranda warning; thus, in order to compare our results to Grisso’s, only 
the responses to the first four Miranda rights were examined. Furthermore, the wording of the Miranda 
warnings studied in Grisso’s investigation differs from the current wording. Thus, the percentages here 
are intended to provide a basic comparison between Grisso’s results and results from the current study; 
more specifically, we have made these comparisons to provide the reader with a context in which to 
understand our results.  
9 Although some very basic comparisons with Goldstein et al.’s (2003) results are made in the 
discussion section, the level of specificity needed to include Goldstein et al.’s results in Table 2 was 
not available in the 2003 journal article.  
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Table 3: Comparison of the Current CMR-II Data with Grisso’s (1981) CMR Data  
 
  Grisso (1981) Current Study 
  Community Adults 
(N=260) 
Detained Juveniles 
(N=431) 
Community Juveniles 
(N=64, 58) 
    Pre Post 
Perfect scores (I-IV) 42.3% 20.9% 34.4% 60.0% 
Perfect scores (I-V)   26.6% 58.3% 
Adequate Responses (2 pt)     
                 Silence 88.5% 89.3% 75.0% 86.7% 
                 Used Against 68.1% 63.1% 56.3% 88.3% 
                 Attorney 66.5% 29.9% 57.8% 85.0% 
                 Appointed 85.4% 85.6% 68.8% 90.0% 
                 Stop questioning    60.9% 93.3% 
Inadequate Responses (0 pt)    
                 Silence 5.0% 8.8% 9.4% 5.0% 
                 Used Against 8.5% 23.9% 10.9% 1.7% 
                 Attorney 14.6% 44.8% 14.1% 1.7% 
                 Appointed 3.1% 4.9% 12.5% 3.3% 
                 Stop questioning             12.5% 1.7% 
     
     
 
FRI. Results of the repeated measures ANOVA for FRI score are reported in 
the subsection labeled, “Appreciation of Miranda rights (Function of Rights in 
Interrogation score).”  Consistent with prior research (e.g., Grisso, 1981), all age 
groups at pre-test appeared to have the basic understanding that an interrogation was 
adversarial, earning mean NI subscale scores of  8.80, 8.46, and 8.89 (out of a 
possible 10 points) respectively (see Table 4). On the RC subscale, which measures 
an examinee’s perception of the role of the attorney in legal proceedings, at both pre- 
and post-test, youth most frequently misunderstood the reason that an attorney would 
want his client to disclose information about the crime (28% earned inadequate scores 
at pre-test, and 13.3% earned inadequate scores at post-test on this item).  In general, 
youth had the greatest difficulty with the RS subscale, which measures an examinee’s 
understanding of the function and durability of the right to silence. Sixty-five percent 
of participants at pre-test believed that even if they were to invoke the right to silence 
                                                                   Miranda Rights Educational Curriculum
    
80
during interrogation, a judge could force them to talk about the crime in court. 
Furthermore, a substantial number of participants (38.1%) believed that the police 
could continue to pressure a suspect to talk about the crime even after the suspect had 
invoked the right to silence.  
 
Table 4: Mean FRI Scores by Age at Pre- and Post-test 
 
 
For the RS subscale, repeated measures ANOVA revealed a main effect of 
time, F (1, 57) = 14.3, p = .001, and age, F (2, 57) = 32.03, p < .001, and a significant 
time by age interaction. Post-hoc comparisons indicated that 10 to 12 year olds 
displayed significantly greater improvement on the RS subscale than did either the 13 
and 14 or 15 and 16 year olds. Despite larger gains, they continued to score lower 
than both the 13 and 14 and 15 and 16 year olds at pre-test (see Figure 4). 
 
 
  10 to 12 year olds 
 
13 & 14 year olds 
 
15 & 16 year olds 
 
  Pre (N=20) Post (19) Pre (24) Post (22) Pre (19) 
 
Post (18) 
Nature of 
interrogation  
8.80 
(1.06) 
 
9.45 
(.83) 
8.46 
(1.80) 
8.73 
(1.40) 
8.89 
(1.40) 
9.28 
(.83) 
Right to counsel 
 
7.70 
(1.98) 
8.70 
(1.56) 
8.67 
(1.37) 
9.59 
(.80) 
9.42 
(1.8) 
9.67 
(1.9) 
 
Right to silence  
 
4.45 
(2.42) 
 
6.00 
(2.27) 
6.63 
(1.84) 
7.55 
(1.92) 
7.00 
(1.8) 
7.67 
(1.9) 
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                       Figure 5. Improvements in RS Subscale Scores by Age 
 
 Although some participants improved in their understanding of these concepts 
following the assembly, many continued to struggle with these items at post-test. 
Specifically, 42% of participants continued to believe that a judge could force a 
juvenile suspect to offer self-incriminating information in court, and 24% of 
participants continued to believe that the police could pressure the suspect to talk, 
even after the suspect had invoked his rights. 
 CMR-R-II and CMV-II. In general, youth displayed more limited, although 
still significant, gains on the CMR-R-II, which assesses an examinee’s ability to 
identify statements as semantically the same or different from each Miranda warning, 
and on the CMV-II, which measures an examinee’s understanding of Miranda 
vocabulary.  On the CMR-R-II, a repeated measures ANOVA revealed a main effect 
of time, F (1, 57) = 9.40, p = .003, and age, F (2, 57) = 21.10, p < .001, and a 
significant time by age interaction, F (2, 57) = 4.53, p < .015. Effect sizes of change 
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from pre- to post-test were .76 (medium) for the 10 to 12 year olds, .1 (small) for the 
13 and 14 year olds, and .28 (small) for the 15 and 16 year olds (see Table 2).   
Post-hoc comparisons indicated that, on average, 10 to 12 year olds displayed 
significantly greater improvement than did either the 13 and 14 or 15 and 16 year olds 
(see Figure 6).  
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Figure 6.  Improvements in CMR-R-II Scores by Age 
 
Upon closer examination, many youth believed that an attorney and a social 
worker performed the same function. In fact, the number of youth equating a social 
worker with an attorney increased from pre- to post-test; 45 % of participants 
responded that “You have the right to speak to a lawyer” meant the same thing as 
“You have the right to speak  to a social worker” at pre-test, and 75% endorsed this 
statement at post-test.   
On the CMV-II, youth provided more accurate definitions of each word at 
post-test than at pre-test; a repeated measures ANOVA revealed a main effect of time, 
F (1, 56) = 11.85, p = .001, and age, F (2, 56) = 20.58, p < .001, and a significant 
time by age interaction, F (2, 56) = 7.22, p = .002. Effect sizes of change from pre- to 
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post-test were .92 (large) for the 10 to 12 year olds, .18 for the 13 and 14 year olds 
(small), and .02 (small) for the 15 and 16 year olds (see Table 2).   
Post-hoc comparisons indicated that, on average, 10 to12 year olds displayed 
significantly greater improvement than did either the 13 and 14 or 15 and 16 year 
olds, although they continued to score lower than either age group at pre-test (see 
Figure 7). 
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Figure 7. Improvements in CMV-II Scores by Age 
 
Youth demonstrated the greatest improvement on “attorney” (55% provided 
two-point definitions at pre-test, compared with 72.9% at post-test) and “appoint” 
(66.7% provided two-point definitions at pre-test, compared with 79.7% at post-test). 
Although some improved, many youth continued to have difficulty defining words 
such as “right” (46.6%  provided two-point responses at pre-test, compared with 
57.6% at post-test),” “represent” (54.0% provided two-point responses at pre-test, 
compared with 59.3% at post-test),” “statement,” (31.7% provided two-point 
responses at pre-test, compared with 33.9% at post-test), and  “consult”  (42.4% 
provided two-point responses at pre-test, compared with 57.6% at post-test).  
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Results for the Judgment in Legal Contexts Instrument (JILC) 
Table 5: JILC Mean Scores by Age at Pre- and Post-test 
 
  10 to 12 year olds 13 & 14 year olds 15 & 16 year olds 
  Pre (N=20) Post (19) Pre (24) Post (22) Pre (19) Post (18) 
Future Recognition 
 
 
2.50 
(SD=2.16) 
3.59 
(1.92) 
3.74 
(2.09) 
3.54 
(2.09) 
3.95 
(1.54) 
3.56 
(1.79) 
Risk Recognition 
 
 
3.75 
(1.48) 
3.83 
(1.86) 
4.48 
(2.04) 
3.68 
(1.73) 
4.18 
(1.65) 
3.86 
(1.61) 
Risk Appreciation  
 
12.16 
(1.50) 
12.89 
(1.45) 
13.65 
(1.40) 
13.14 
(1.52) 
13.00 
(1.70) 
12.72 
(1.93) 
       
 
 
 Recognition of long-range future consequences (Future Recognition score).  
At pre-test, ANOVA revealed a main effect of age, F (2, 59) = 2.17, p = .049. As 
summarized in Table 5, 10 to 12 year olds identified fewer long-range consequences 
(defined as any consequence that follows a waiver/assertion decision “after a delay of 
several days”) than did either the 13 and 14 or 15 and 16 year olds.  
 Contrary to the prediction that the curriculum would result in overall 
improvement in recognition of long-range consequences and that these improvements 
would vary by age, the repeated measures ANOVA revealed no main effect of time, F 
(1, 54) =.046, p = .831, or age, F (2, 54) = 1.22, p < .304.  As illustrated in Figure 8, 
10 to 12 year olds generally identified more long-range consequences at post-test; 
however, 13 and 14 and 15 and 16 year olds identified fewer long-range 
consequences; these age-based differences were not significant, however, F (2, 54) = 
1.55, p < .222.  
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Figure 8. Changes in Future Recognition by Age 
 
 Recognition of adverse consequences (Risk Recognition score). As 
summarized in Table 5, at pre-test, 10 to 12 year olds generally identified slightly 
fewer risks associated with waiver/assertion decisions than did either the 13 and 14 or 
15 and 16 year olds. Despite this pattern of results, risk recognition did not 
significantly differ across age groups at baseline, F (2, 59) =1.08, p = .348.  
 Contrary to the prediction that the curriculum would improve youths’ 
recognition of adverse consequences to waiver/assertion decisions and that these 
improvements would vary by age, results of the repeated measures ANOVA revealed 
no main effect for time, F (1, 54) = 3.30, p =.077, or age, F (2, 54) =.45, p = .639, and 
no significant time by age interaction, F (2, 54) = 3.07, p = .54 (see Figure 9). 
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Figure 9. Changes in Risk Recognition by Age 
 
           Severity of impact of adverse consequences (Risk Appraisal score). As 
summarized in Table 5, on average, 10 to 12 year olds judged the impact of potential 
negative consequences of waiver/assertion decisions (e.g., being sent to jail, judge 
finding the suspect guilty in court, police brutality) as less severe than did either the 
13 and 14 year olds or 15 and 16 year olds at pre-test, F (2, 61) = 4.97, p = .01.   
         Contrary to the prediction that participants would appraise adverse 
consequences of waiver/assertion decisions as more severe following the curriculum 
and that these increases would vary by age, there was no main effect of time, F (1, 
53) = .000, p = .990, or age, F (2, 53) = 2.06, p = .138, and no significant time by age 
interaction, F (2, 53) = 2.69, p = .077 (see Figure 10). 
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Figure 10. Changes in Risk Appraisal by Age 
 
 Advice to a juvenile suspect and self-choice.  On the JILC, participants are 
asked to recommend a course of action (i.e., confessing to the offense, denying the 
offense, or invoking the right to silence) to a juvenile suspect (Joe) accused of being 
involved in an armed robbery and to provide a rationale for that course of action.  
 At pre-test youth were fairly evenly split between advising Joe to confess or to 
invoke the right to silence; forty-five percent of youth advised Joe to confess the 
crime to the police, 53% advised him to invoke the right to silence, and 5% advised 
him to deny the crime to the police (see Table 6).  
 
Table 6: Advice to Joe at Pre- and Post-test  
 
  10-12 year olds 13 & 14 year olds 15 &16 year olds Total 
 Pre  
(N=20) 
Post 
(19) 
Pre 
(24) 
Post 
(22) 
Pre 
(19) 
Post 
(18) 
Pre 
(62) 
Post 
(58) 
Talk/admit 14 12 9 12 5 4 28 28 
 
Talk/deny 1 2 1 0 1 0 2 2 
 
Remain Silent 5 4 14 10 13 14 32 28 
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There was a significant relationship between age and advice to Joe, χ² (4) = 
9.76, p = .045.  Ten to 12 year olds were most likely to advise Joe to confess the 
crime, while 15 and 16 year olds were most likely to advise Joe to invoke the right to 
silence; 13 and 14 year olds were more evenly split between the options (see Figure 
11). 
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                                   Figure 11. Advice to Joe at Pre-test 
 
The last question on the JILC asks participants what they would do if they 
were in Joe’s situation: confess the crime to police, deny involvement, or invoke the 
right to silence. As illustrated in Table 7, at pre-test, youth were fairly evenly split 
between reporting that they would confess the crime to police or invoke the right to 
silence.  
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Table 7: Self-choice at Pre and Post-test by Age  
 
  10 to 12 year olds 13 & 14 year olds 15 &16 year olds Total 
  Pre 
(N=20) 
Post 
(18) 
Pre 
(23) 
Post 
(22) 
Pre 
(19) 
Post 
(18) 
Pre 
(62) 
Post 
(58) 
 
Talk/admit 
 
15 
 
11 
 
13 
 
13 
 
5 
 
 
4 
 
33 
 
28 
 
Talk/deny 
 
1 
 
2 
 
1 
 
0 
 
1 
 
 
0 
 
3 
 
2 
 
Remain Silent 
 
4 
 
5 
 
9 
 
9 
 
13 
 
      14 
 
26 
 
28 
 
 
As illustrated in Figure 12, there was a significant relationship between age 
and self-choice, χ²  (4) = 10.85, p= .028, with 10 to 12 year olds tending to be more 
likely to chose confession than the 13 and 14 and 15 and 16 year olds.  Broken down 
by age, 10 to 12 year olds were most likely to report that they would confess the 
crime to police, while 15 and 16 year olds were most likely to invoke the right to 
silence. Thirteen and 14 year olds were more evenly split between choosing to 
confess the crime to police or to invoke the right to silence. 
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Figure 12. Self-choice by Age at Pre-test 
 
 
 
 As summarized in Table 8, at pre-test. when participants advised Joe to 
confess the crime, they tended to believe that the confession would result in leniency 
from the police or judge (e.g., “It’s better to be honest and tell the truth; admitting to 
it will lead him to a lesser punishment”) or that the confession represented the 
morally right decision (e.g., “Because it’s the right thing to do and maybe he’ll feel 
good and maybe he’ll change”). As summarized in Table 9, when participants advised 
Joe to invoke the right to silence at pre-test, they tended to acknowledge the value of 
withholding self-incriminating evidence or the benefit of counsel (e.g., “Police could 
trick him into saying something and use it against him later;” “Because he can get 
advice from a lawyer, a lawyer knows about rights and what could help him”).  
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Table 8: Participants’ Rationale for Advising Joe to Confess to the Crime by Age 
 
   10-12 year olds 13 &14 year olds 15 & 16 year 
olds 
Total 
   Pre 
(N=14) 
Post 
(12) 
Pre 
(12) 
Post 
(12) 
Pre 
(5) 
Post 
(14) 
Pre 
(29) 
Post 
(28) 
 
Morality of truth 
 
6 
 
7 
 
1 
 
5 
 
0 
 
0 
 
12 
 
12 
 
Leniency/harshness  
 
7 
 
4 
 
4 
 
6 
 
3 
 
3 
 
14 
 
13 
 
Assumption of 
guilt/innocence 
 
1 
 
0 
 
1 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
2 
 
0 
 
Attorney assistance 
 
2 
 
2 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
1 
 
Parental assistance 
 
0 
 
1 
 
4 
 
2 
 
8 
 
5 
 
13 
 
10 
 
Plea reached 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
2 
 
1 
 
2 
 
1 
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Table 9: Participants’ Rationale for Advising Joe to Invoke the Right to Silence by Age 
 
   10-12 year olds 13 &14 year olds 15 & 16 year 
olds 
Total 
   Pre 
(N=5) 
Post 
(4) 
Pre 
(14) 
Post 
(10) 
Pre 
(15) 
Post 
(13) 
Pre 
(34) 
Post 
(30) 
 
Leniency/Harshness 
 
0 
 
0 
 
4 
 
1 
 
1 
 
3 
 
6 
 
5 
 
Assumption of    
    guilt/innocence  
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
2 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
2 
 
Questioning Stopped 
 
1 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
1 
 
0 
 
Disposition at trial  
 
0 
 
0 
 
1 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
1 
 
0 
 
Benefit of atty 
 
2 
 
2 
 
5 
 
4 
 
4 
 
4 
 
11 
 
10 
 
Self incrimination 
 
2 
 
2 
 
4 
 
2 
 
8 
 
5 
 
13 
 
10 
 
Avoid lying 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
 
1 
 
1 
 
Anger avoided  
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
1 
 
0 
 
1 
 
0 
 
Freedom  
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
1 
 
0 
 
1 
 
 
 
When participants’ self-choice differed from their advice to Joe, they tended 
to cite Joe’s prior arrest history (i.e., in the vignette, participants are told that Joe “has 
been in trouble with the police before”) as the rationale for the discrepancy (e.g., “I 
would confess, but Joe should say nothing to the police because he’s been in trouble 
before so he really needs a lawyer;” or “Joe should admit [what he did]  because he’s 
had problems in the past and needs to show that he’s being cooperative, but I 
wouldn’t say anything”).   
  Despite significant improvements in comprehension and appreciation of 
rights, similar patterns of advice to Joe and self-choice at pre-test emerged at post-
test. Friedman’s chi square revealed no significant changes in, either, participants’ 
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advice to Joe, χ² (1) = .89, p = .346, or participants’ self-choice, χ² (1) = .529, p = 
.467, from pre- to post-test. As summarized Tables 6 and 7, for both advice to Joe and 
self-choice, youth were fairly evenly split between choosing to admit the crime to the 
police or to invoke the right to silence.  Broken down by age, at post-test, 10 to 12 
year olds were most likely to report that they would confess the crime to police, while 
15 and 16 year olds were most likely to invoke the right to silence. Thirteen and 14 
year olds were more evenly split between choosing to confess the crime to police or 
to invoke the right to silence (see Figures 13 and 14).  
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Discussion 
Improvements in the Understanding and Appreciation of Rights 
 Consistent with the prediction that the curriculum would improve youths’ 
overall comprehension, factual understanding, and appreciation of the Miranda 
warnings, youth in our sample demonstrated improvements in all three areas.   
 Broken down by subtest, the greatest gains were achieved on the CMR-II and 
the FRI, suggesting that the curriculum was particularly useful in improving youths’ 
overall knowledge of the content of the warnings, as well as their abilities to apply 
this new knowledge to hypothetical legal situations. Indeed, scores earned by youth 
on the CMR-II, following completion of the curriculum, surpassed scores earned by 
the adults in Grisso’s (1981) study.  
 Despite greater gains across each measure, 10 to 12 year olds generally failed 
to achieve the levels of understanding and appreciation that were achieved by older 
youth. At both assessment times, on every Miranda measure, 10 to 12 year olds 
scored lower than older youth. While the 13 and 14 year olds tended to score lower 
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than the15 and 16 year olds, these differences were not significant.  Notably, for 10 to 
12 year olds, mean post-test scores for Overall Miranda Comprehension, Factual 
Understanding, CMR-II, CMR-R-II, CMV-II, and RS subscale continued to fall below 
the mean pre-test scores of both the 13- and 14- and 15- and 16-year-old age groups, 
suggesting that even when younger youth received educational instruction, their 
levels of comprehension and appreciation continued to fall below levels achieved by 
older youth without any Miranda education.  
Changes in Judgment-based Abilities  
  Contrary to predictions, in general, youth did not display improvement across 
scores on the JILC following participation in the curriculum. In fact, 13 and 14 and 
15 and 16 year olds generally displayed decreases (although not significant) in Future 
Recognition, Risk Recognition, and Risk Appraisal scores. Interestingly, at post-test, 
youth from each age group achieved comparable scores. We propose several 
explanations to account for this phenomenon.  
 First, as with the MRCI-II data, results from the JILC may support the 
characterization of legal decision making as a developmental, rather than knowledge-
based, ability.  Research suggests that rights-relevant, judgment-based abilities, such 
as future recognition, risk recognition, and risk appraisal, continue to develop well 
into late adolescence and early adulthood (e.g., Furby & Beyth-Marom, 1990; Grisso 
& Vierling, 1978; Mann, Harmoni, & Power, 1989); therefore, education about 
Miranda rights may not improve these judgment-based skills. Rather, youth may need 
to wait for the natural, cognitive, neurological, and emotional development that 
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occurs in their late teens and early adulthood in order to improve these psychosocial 
abilities.   
 Second, the slight decreases in Future and Risk Recognition scores for the 13 
and 14 and 15 and 16 year olds may be related to how the measure is scored. 
Importantly, these scores are generated by counting the absolute number of long-
range and adverse consequences provided by the participant, regardless of the 
accuracy of these consequences. For example, “if he remains silent, the judge will use 
it against him in court and give him more punishment” is considered a long-range 
consequence and contributes to the Future Recognition score, despite its flawed 
reasoning. Thus, decreases in scores may reflect older participants’ improved 
accuracy; with increased understanding, older adolescents should provide fewer 
inaccurate responses, resulting in lower Future and Risk Recognition scores.   
Third, it may be that the JILC lacks the sensitivity to detect quantitative 
changes from pre- to post-test assessment. As the JILC requires individuals to provide 
detailed responses to hypothetical legal dilemmas, as well as rationales for these 
responses, the measure may have more utility when used to detect qualitative changes 
in reasoning. 
 A final explanation parallels the hypothesis that legal decision-making skills 
are developmental abilities and supports a central component of conceptual change 
theory: Misconceptions are resistant to change, even in the face of contradictory 
evidence. This possibility is discussed in detail below. 
Legal Decision Making as a Developmental Ability: Results in the Context of 
Conceptual Change Theory  
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 Earlier, we hypothesized that adolescents have misconceptions about the 
content, function, and significance of the Miranda warnings and the purpose of 
interrogation (e.g., “Even if I remain silent while the police are questioning me, the 
judge can force me to talk in court if he wants to;” “If I cooperate with the police by 
waiving my rights, the police/judge may decide to be lenient with me;” “If I assert my 
rights, the police/judge will think I am guilty and my punishment will be worse”).  
We argued that these misconceptions reflected common heuristics that derived 
evidentiary support from the youth’s daily experiences (i.e., “When personal safety is 
at stake, cooperation with authority is the best alternative,” and “it is best to tell the 
truth so as not to get into more trouble”). Thus, we asserted that facilitating legal 
reasoning skills required, not only quantitative changes in the youth’s repertoire of 
legal knowledge, but, also, more radical qualitative changes in the individual’s 
interpretative, conceptual framework (i.e., the system of personal preferences, values, 
beliefs, and heuristics that the individual uses to approach legal dilemmas).  
 Consistent with the basic premises of conceptual change theory (Posner, 
Strike, Hewson, & Gertzog, 1982), despite quantitative improvements in factual 
knowledge of the content and function of rights, at post-test, many youth continued 
to: (a) believe that judges and police officers would be more lenient with those 
defendants who confessed to the crime, (b) believe that judges could force suspects to 
talk in court even after they invoked the right to silence during interrogation, (c) 
advise Joe to confess to the crime on the basis that confession would engender 
leniency, (d) report that they would confess to the crime if they were in Joe’s 
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situation, (d) fail to appreciate the advocacy role of the attorney, and (e) confound 
invoking the right to silence with being uncooperative.   
 As the curriculum heavily emphasized the adversarial nature of interrogation 
and the durability of the right to silence across legal contexts, it is remarkable that 
many participants continued to believe that a confession to the police would result in 
leniency and that invoking the right to silence could be used against them in court. Of 
course, one plausible explanation for this finding is that participants confounded the 
role of the police with the role of the attorney; specifically, a review of participants’ 
rationales for advising Joe to confess suggested that a substantial portion of youth 
believed that police officers and defense attorneys elicit disclosure about the crime 
from the suspect for the same reason: to negotiate a lesser sentence with the 
prosecutor. Although plea bargaining is certainly a motivation for a defense attorney 
to elicit information about the crime from his client, police officers encourage 
disclosure to garner evidence that can be used against the suspect in court. 
 However, this explanation does not seem sufficient on its own. Although, at 
first glance, it may seem that the curriculum failed to increase participants’ awareness 
of this distinction between the police and the defense attorney, a review of scores on 
the NI and RC subscales of the FRI tells a different story. High scores on the NI 
subscale, which measures an examinee’s understanding of why the police encourage 
disclosure about the crime, and significant improvements on the RC subscale, which 
measures an adolescent’s understanding of why the attorney encourages disclosure 
about the crime, suggest that, at least superficially, participants generally recognized 
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that disclosing self-incriminating information to the police conferred risk, whereas 
disclosing such information to the attorney conferred benefit.   
 Thus, it may be that our data illustrate a key tenet of conceptual change 
theory. Strike and Posner (1992) argued that, whereas declarative learning involves 
the accumulation of facts, conceptual change requires the reorganization of extant 
frameworks to encompass new ideas, values, beliefs, and heuristics. Consistent with 
their theory, the “cost” of conceptual change of Miranda rights and police 
interrogations was “high” because it involved the alteration of misconceptions that 
were “central” to participants’ interpretative frameworks; unless instruction altered 
the entire framework, students should have continued to maintain the misconception 
(p.150).   
 Although Strike and Posner (1992) recognized the role of cognitive conflict in 
facilitating conceptual change, they acknowledged that age and cognitive 
developmental level were key determinants in whether conceptual change could 
occur; the experience of cognitive conflict, in the absence of biological, social, and 
emotional maturation, is often insufficient to facilitate the development of reasoning. 
Indeed, consistent with other research that characterizes legal decision making as a 
developmental, rather than knowledge-based ability (e.g., Grisso et al., 2003; 
Goldstein et al., 2003), age may be the more salient factor in legal decision making. 
Notably, Phase II of this study will address the role of development in facilitating 
changes in legal reasoning.  
The Relationship between Age and Miranda Comprehension and Appreciation: 
Results in the Context of Previous Research  
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 Consistent with extant research, results of the current study suggest that age is 
a primary predictor of Miranda comprehension. Similar to Grisso’s (1981) and 
Goldstein et al.’s (2003) findings, younger adolescents scored consistently lower than 
older adolescents on the MRCI-II. In general, youth in our study scored slightly 
higher on the MRCI-II than did youth in Grisso’s (1981) and Goldstein et al.’s (2003) 
studies. As IQ has been shown to significantly predict Miranda scores (e.g., Grisso, 
1981; Goldstein et al., 2003), our participants’ generally higher Miranda scores may 
be explained by their High Average to Superior Verbal IQs, which were typically 25 
to 35 points higher than the average IQ scores Grisso (1981) and Goldstein and 
colleagues (2003) reported in their studies (81 and 83 respectively) .  
 Despite higher scores across measures, the age-based patterns of Miranda 
scores in our sample were remarkably similar to those patterns of Miranda scores 
obtained by Grisso (1981) with his sample of detained youth. Based on his results, 
Grisso (1981) concluded that youth under the age of 15 failed to meet adult standards 
of Miranda comprehension, and youth ages 15 and older generally achieved adult 
levels of understanding. In the current study, youth, ages 10 to 14, tended to score 
lower than did youth ages 15 and 16. Overall, 34.4% of youth in the current study 
achieved perfect scores on prongs I through V of the Miranda warning, but accuracy 
varied by age; only 27.0% of youth, ages 14 and under, received perfect scores, while 
52.6% of youth, ages 15 and 16, obtained perfect scores.  
 Youth in the current study manifested other, striking similarities to youth from 
previous studies. First, consistent with Grisso (1981) and Goldstein et al. (2003), on 
the CMR-II, youth were more likely to provide a zero or one point response to the 
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third Miranda warning (the right to an attorney) than to any other Miranda warning. 
Second, in terms of FRI performance, youth in all three samples had the greatest 
difficulty understanding the function of the right to silence. Substantial portions of 
youth in each study believed that a judge could force the defendant to talk in court, 
even if the defendant invoked the right to silence during interrogation. Third, on the 
CMV-II, consistent with Grisso (1981) and Goldstein et al. (2003), youth in the 
current study displayed the greatest difficulty defining “consult” and “right.”  
 Compared with older youth, younger youth in the current study (a) identified 
significantly fewer long-range consequences to waiver decisions, (b) identified fewer 
adverse consequences to waiver decisions (although the difference was not 
significant), (c) appraised negative consequences to waiver decision as significantly 
less severe, and (d) were more likely to advise Joe to confess the crime and report that 
they would confess the crime if they were in Joe’s situation. Grisso and colleagues 
(2003) found similar results in their study comparing the adjudicative competence of 
adolescents to adults. Specifically, they found that younger youth (i.e., ages 11 to 13) 
reported significantly fewer long-range consequences, adverse consequences, and 
perceived adverse consequences of waiver/assertion decisions to be less severe than 
did either older adolescents (i.e., ages 14 through 17) or  young adults (i.e., ages 18 
through 21). Furthermore, younger youth, in Grisso and colleagues’ (2003) study, 
were more likely to advise “Joe” to confess the crime to police than were older 
adolescents or young adults.  
Implications for Law-related Education (LRE) and Public Policy  
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 Given the pivotal role of cognitive development in advancing legal reasoning, 
the curriculum appears to have stimulated important changes in youths’ factual 
understanding and appreciation of rights.  Furthermore, in spite of our prediction that 
cognitive and psychosocial immaturity may impede legal learning in younger youth, 
results suggest that even younger youth can learn about rights. In fact, younger youth 
tended to confer more benefit from the curriculum than did older youth.   
 The American Bar Association’s Special Committee on Youth Education for 
Citizenship (1995) recommended that LRE programs consist of “integrated, 
sequenced, and cumulative instructional experiences.” They further acknowledged the 
importance of developmentally appropriate educational programming, recommending 
that law-related education be “woven throughout the school curriculum,” beginning 
in the primary grades and continuing throughout high school (p.2). Consistent with 
these recommendations, we believe that the Miranda Rights Educational Curriculum 
could play an important part of a more comprehensive, school-wide legal curriculum. 
Revisions to the curriculum, informed by our results and continuing research, may 
enhance its effectiveness.  
 Although 85% of participants at post-test provided two-point responses when 
asked to paraphrase the rights to silence and counsel, responses on other measures 
suggested that youth continued to lack confidence in the efficacy of these rights. 
Given that the curriculum depicted only an interrogation scenario, it may be that 
adolescents had difficulty contextualizing their understanding of rights within other 
rights-relevant legal scenarios, such as consultation with an attorney and court 
hearings. Thus, to increase youths’ confidence in the efficacy of rights, future 
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versions of the curriculum may need to include several, sequential, interactive 
experiential plays that follow a juvenile suspect through common situations in the 
legal process (i.e., arrest, interrogation, consultation with an attorney, and court 
hearings). 
 Additionally, as reflected in the effect sizes, the more limited gains achieved 
by the older youth may reflect the fact that, to maintain a clean research design (i.e., 
to use the same curriculum with all ages), the curriculum was written at the 5th grade 
level; thus, the presentation of concepts may have been more salient to younger youth 
and may have deprived the older youth of more nuanced concepts that they could 
have understood (e.g., that a potential negative consequence to Miranda is that guilty 
suspects may go free).  The addition of more complex, participatory activities that 
require a greater degree of subtlety may be needed to facilitate cognitive conflict in 
older, more cognitively advanced youth.  
Limitations 
    Ecological validity. Although we propose that adolescents who demonstrate 
greater understanding of rights and the function of rights will be better equipped to 
make legal decisions, even perfect understanding of rights offers no guarantee of a 
juvenile suspect’s decision in an actual interrogation situation. As the totality of 
circumstances test suggests, characteristics of the suspect (e.g., age, academic 
achievement, arrest history, mental status) as well as characteristics of the 
interrogation and arrest (e.g., time of day that the interrogation takes place, length of 
time the suspect is held incommunicado, conditions of the interrogation room, 
severity of the charges, police demeanor), may strongly influence the adolescent’s 
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waiver decision (Grisso, 2003). Further research is needed to determine how gains in 
factual knowledge translate to changes in confession behavior during real-life 
interrogations.  
 Generalizability.  The generalizability of our results may be restricted by our 
relatively small sample; however, the fact that we achieved significant results in spite 
of small sample size indicates sufficient power and suggests meaningful effects. 
Furthermore, participants in the current study do not share important characteristics 
with youth at-risk for arrest and interrogation, the group who may be in most need of 
practical, legal-rights education. Participants in the current sample were 
predominantly Caucasian, from upper SES backgrounds, and typically displayed IQ 
scores in the High Average and Superior Ranges. In contrast, youth at-risk for justice 
system involvement typically belong to ethnic minority groups, come from low SES 
backgrounds, and display Low Average IQs (Office of Juvenile Justice and 
Delinquency Prevention, 2002).  
Indeed, evidence suggests that sociological influences, such as race and SES, 
heavily influence perceptions of law enforcement officials. Caucasians and 
individuals living in low-crime neighborhoods tend to have more favorable attitudes 
towards police officers than African-Americans or individuals living in high-crime 
neighborhoods (e.g., Decker, 1981; Dunham & Alpert, 1988). Thus, research is 
needed to assess the effectiveness of the curriculum with a larger, more racially and 
economically diverse sample.   
 Although participants from the current study do not share important 
characteristics with at-risk youth who may be in most need of practical legal rights 
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education, in many respects, our research site provided an optimal population for the 
current project. As the first study in a programmatic series of research, we were 
primarily interested in learning whether the curriculum could affect change in youths’ 
comprehension of the Miranda rights in an ideal situation. Arguably, if students with 
high average IQ scores and excellent verbal abilities do not benefit from the 
curriculum, then it seems unlikely that at-risk youth will benefit from the curriculum. 
Thus, conducting the study at a private, college preparatory school virtually 
eliminated potentially important, confounding variables, such as low IQ, learning 
difficulties, poor verbal skills, severe mental health issues, and pervasive attentional 
difficulties.  
No control group. The current study did not include a control group for two 
reasons. First, the small school size would have prevented enrolling a sufficient 
number of students in each condition.  Although we could have increased sample size 
by adding an additional school, we felt that we would confound the results of the 
study by introducing variance generated by the different educational and social 
culture at another school.  Thus, for this first study on the curriculum, we decided it 
was better to have fewer subjects and omit a control group than to include a second 
(or third or fourth) school that might differ from the primary site in important ways.  
Second, as the post-evaluation period occurred within weeks of the pre-evaluation 
period, pre-test scores were able to serve as a baseline measure, and maturation 
should not have played a critical role in improving Miranda comprehension and legal 
reasoning from pre- to post-test.  
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The omission of a control group might generate concern that participation in the 
curriculum would result in outside conversations about Miranda rights and 
interrogations, thereby introducing the possibility that these conversations, rather than 
the curriculum itself, could account for improvements in rights comprehension and 
legal reasoning.  To address this concern, school faculty agreed to refrain from 
providing any instruction about Miranda rights and interrogations after the 
administration of the curriculum.  Nevertheless, students probably discussed the 
curriculum with peers and/or family members. Although these discussions may have 
contributed to the improvement in scores, these discussions are an integral part of 
deep-level processing and conceptual change learning (Chinn & Brewer, 1992); thus, 
rather than confounding our results, we anticipated these conversations as resulting 
from our curriculum and believe that peer and family discussions played an important 
and expected role in facilitating youths’ learning about rights.  Future research should 
examine the occurrence of such conversations following participation in the 
curriculum and the role of such discussions in youths’ learning about Miranda rights 
and legal decision making.    
Despite these limitations, we believe that, when conceptualized as the first study 
in a programmatic series of research, the Miranda Rights Education Project provides 
several unique contributions to the field. To our knowledge, this is the first project to 
collect quantitative and qualitative data on adolescents’ understanding of rights at two 
time points (and we will be collecting it at a third time point); thus, our data provide 
an important first glance at how youths’ legal decision-making skills change over 
time. Furthermore, results of the current study suggest that qualitative measurements 
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yield important data, not captured by the MRCI-II.  Specifically, improvements in 
factual knowledge on the MRCI-II, did not necessarily translate into decision–making 
changes on the JILC.  Thus, administering the MRCI-II and JILC together may 
generate a more comprehensive picture of youths’ legal reasoning. 
Furthermore, in accordance with Dishion and Patterson (as cited in Lochman, 
1999), we characterized this study as “model building,” rather than “model testing” 
(p. 362).  Indeed, we did not suggest that our data would provide any definitive 
answers regarding the role of cognitive conflict in the development of legal 
reasoning. Dishion and Patterson (as cited in Lochman, 1999) argued that basic 
intervention studies are not meant to answer specific questions about a phenomenon 
(in their case, antisocial behavior) “once and for all” (p. 362) Rather, the results from 
such studies should be used to clarify or revise the conceptual model on which the 
intervention is based.  
 Furthermore, results provide evidence that even younger youth can learn 
about rights. Indeed, the curriculum appears to have produced significant 
improvements in Miranda comprehension and appreciation within each age group. 
Our robust age-related results provide further evidence that, although legal reasoning 
can be improved by an educational intervention, it may be, largely, a developmental 
capacity. To our knowledge, this was the first study to assess adolescents’ 
understanding of the content, significance, and function of the Miranda warnings in a 
high IQ, high SES sample. We found relationships between age and Miranda 
comprehension that closely parallel those found in previous research; this is 
particularly noteworthy, given that participants from the current study have little in 
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common with participants from previous studies. These findings suggest that the role 
of age in Miranda understanding and appreciation and, perhaps, legal reasoning more 
broadly, may transcend important demographic characteristics and provide further 
evidence that legal reasoning is a developmental capacity.   
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Appendix A: The Miranda Rights Educational Curriculum 
 
 
Miranda Rights Educational Assembly: “An Armed Robbery in LOCAL Park” 
 
Participants: 
Narrator 
Police Officer 
Student suspect 
 
(Slide 1 - Blank Slide) 
 
Narrator: This is an interactive play. Today, we would like you to pretend that you 
are suspects in a crime. This is Detective Smith. He is here to ask you some 
questions.  
 
(Detective Smith takes center stage and announces details of the crime) 
 
Officer: Hello, my name is Detective Smith. I am here to find out if any of you have 
any information about an armed robbery that occurred in LOCAL Park last 
Friday afternoon.  
 
(Slide 2: The Crime) 
 
On Friday afternoon, February 17th, Jeffrey Murphy, a 14 year-old, 9th grade 
student from NIEGHBORING High School was skateboarding in LOCAL 
Park. At approximately 3:15 P.M., a teenage girl walked up to Jeff was. The 
girl asked Jeff if she could use his cell phone to make a phone call. As Jeff 
searched his backpack for his phone, two boys walked up to Jeff from behind. 
                                                                   Miranda Rights Educational Curriculum
    
122
One of the boys had a WEAPON and threatened to hurt Jeff if he didn’t hand 
over his money, his skateboard, and his back-pack. Jeff screamed for help, at 
which point the boy holding the WEAPON pushed Jeff to the sidewalk and 
kicked him in the head and stomach. The girl grabbed Jeff’s backpack and the 
other boy grabbed the skateboard; the three teenagers ran down the street. Jeff 
was injured in the head and neck. In addition, he received injuries to his face, 
lower stomach, and rib cage.  
 
(Slide 3: The Suspects) 
 
We are looking for three suspects: two boys between the ages of 14 and 16 
and a girl approximately 15 years old.  The boys were between 5 feet 6 inches 
and 5 feet 11 inches  tall and dressed similarly wearing jeans, tee-shirts, and 
baseball caps. The girl was about 5 feet 5 inches tall and is described having 
light brown hair pulled back in a ponytail. She was seen wearing a red sweater 
and blue jeans.  
 
We have reason to believe that someone in this auditorium may have some 
information that can help us solve the crime. 
 
(Slide 4: Blank Slide) 
 
Two people saw the crime happen and were able to help us come up with this 
sketch of the suspect. Could everyone take a minute to look at this? 
 
(Detective Smith walks around the auditorium with the sketch, searching for 
the suspect. He approaches the confederate in the audience.) 
 
Officer:  (to the confederate) Excuse me, what is your name? 
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Student: (To ease readability of this curriculum, the name “Andrew Brown” will be 
used for the suspect. However the name of the suspect should be the actual 
name of the student used to play the role.) Andrew Brown. Ummmm…. is 
something wrong? 
 
Officer: Andrew, would you mind coming with me? I want to find out if you have 
any information about the crime that occurred on Friday.  
 
Andrew: (confused) Sure, whatever I can do to help.   
 
(Police officer walks with the student onto the stage. There are two chairs. No other 
furniture is on stage). 
 
Officer: Why don’t you have a seat, Andrew. 
  
Andrew: Is everything okay? 
 
Officer: (reassuring tone) Everything is fine. Andrew, I’m hoping that you might 
know something that can help us solve this crime. I just need you to answer 
some questions and then, hopefully, we can get out of here. 
  
Andrew: Okay. I hope I can help. 
 
Officer:  (Pages through his chart) So did you know this kid, Jeff Murphy? 
 
Andrew: Yeah, I knew who he was but we weren’t friends or anything. We played 
POPULAR SPORT together for the LOCAL League. 
 
Officer:  Yeah, other kids have told us about Jeff Murphy…seems like he has quite 
the reputation.  Nobody likes a kid who brags and shows off his stuff. Some 
people might say he deserved what he got. 
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Andrew: Yeah, I hate kids who brag.   
 
Officer:  (approvingly) You seem like a pretty down to earth kid, seems like you 
wouldn't stand for this kind of show-off business. 
 
Andrew:  Yeah, I really don’t spend too much time with kids like that.   
 
Officer: Kids like Jeff Murphy make a lot of enemies. Andrew, can you think of 
anybody who might want might want to hurt him? 
 
Andrew: I don’t know-lots of kids I guess. He was always talking about all the stuff 
he had. A lot of kids thought he was cool-but a lot of kids just thought he was 
a real jerk. 
 
Officer: (changes tone slightly) So, where were you last Friday afternoon between 
2:15-3:30? 
 
Andrew: Ummm… Let’s see. I got home from school and my mom was still at work, 
so I took my dog out for a walk. It’s something that I do everyday after 
school. 
 
Officer:  Andrew, I need to take this call. Sit tight for a moment.  
(Det. Smith gets up, and has a whispered conversation on the side of the 
stage. Det. Smith walks back towards Andrew and sits down in a chair.) 
 
Officer: (heavy sigh) Andrew…, what are we going to do here?  
 
 Andrew: Ummmm… (pauses, and then, as if reading the officer’s demeanor), is 
everything ok? 
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Officer: I don’t know Andrew. (Pauses and stares at Andrew) Why might someone 
have reason to think that they saw you at LOCAL Park around 3:00 on the 
afternoon of the crime? 
 
Andrew: (Puzzled) They wouldn’t. I don’t know-unless they were confused or 
something. (Pauses, he’s beginning to recognize where this is going) Wait a 
minute-is there something wrong? 
 
Officer: (pulls seat closer to Andrew) Andrew we have reason to believe that you 
might not be telling us the whole truth here.  We have two witnesses who say 
they saw you at LOCAL Park on Friday afternoon.  Now, I don’t want you to 
get accused of something that you didn’t do. That’s why I’m talking to you 
now-you can probably tell that I’m trying to help you out. Can you see that? 
 
Andrew: Yeah… But I didn’t do…  
 
Officer: (interrupts) Alright, Andrew, before I ask you any more questions, I need to 
advise you of your rights. It’s very important that you listen carefully and that 
you tell me if you do not understand something.  
 
(Officer reads Andrew the Miranda Rights and hands him a card with these rights on 
them) 
 
(1) You have the right to remain silent. 
(2) Anything you say can be used against you in court. 
(3) You have the right to talk to a lawyer and to have him present with you while 
you are being questioned. 
(4) If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed to represent you 
before any questioning if you wish. 
(5)  If you decide to answer questions now without a lawyer present, you still 
have the right to stop questioning at any time until you talk to a lawyer 
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Andrew, do you understand each of these rights I have explained to you? 
 
Andrew: Yes. 
 
Officer: Understanding what these rights mean, do you wish to talk to me now? 
 
Andrew: Sure. I guess. I mean I’d like to help but you have to know that I didn’t 
have anything to do…   
  
Officer: (interrupts) Andrew, we have two witnesses that say they saw you in 
LOCAL Park last Friday-but you’re telling me that you were at home walking 
the dog.  Now why would people say that they saw you?  
 
Andrew: (flustered) I don’t know… Sometimes I walk the dog there… People see 
me with the dog all the time. Maybe they got confused? Wait a minute this is 
all wrong… I wouldn’t… I didn’t… 
 
Officer: (interrupts) You’re telling me that you were doing one thing, and now I’ve 
got two people telling me you were doing something else. Can you see why 
I’m confused? Can you help me out here? I’d like to understand. 
 
Andrew: But-I don’t understand-who said they saw me? I- 
 
Officer:  (interrupts, getting impatient) Andrew let me make myself clear. We have 
two eyewitness accounts here, that means that people are telling us that they 
saw you push Jeffrey to the sidewalk, kick him, and grab his backpack. Do 
you know how big that is in terms of the case we’re building against you? I 
mean we’re questioning some of your friends now-and you know what they’re 
doing? They’re cooperating and answering our questions. I’d hate to see all 
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the blame get put on you. Now, how could it be that two people say they saw 
you there? 
 
Andrew:  But I didn’t-(pauses) I don’t think I walked the dog in LOCAL Park –
(bewildered and confused) I don’t know maybe I did and just don’t 
remember? 
 
Officer: (Irritable and impatient) You don’t think you walked the dog in LOCAL 
Park, but maybe you did? (Pauses). Andrew, I got to tell you-things don’t look 
so good for you right now. We have eyewitnesses saying you were there, you 
yourself don’t seem so clear about where you were, we have motive… 
 
Andrew: Motive? What motive? I didn’t do this! I swear! What reason would I have 
to hurt Jeff Murphy? 
 
Officer: Andrew, you told me that you hated kids who bragged, that Jeff had a lot of 
enemies… 
 
Andrew: Yeah-but I didn’t-  
 
Officer: (in a calm, slow, quiet voice) Okay, Andrew, let me give you some advice. 
I’d like to help you out, but you’re going to have to tell me what happened 
(Andrew is showing visible signs of stress e.g., wringing his hands, furrowed 
brow, etc.)(Moving his chair closer to Andrew) Andrew, I can tell that you’re 
about ready to breakdown so I’m going to help you. You are going to have to 
make a decision here. Am I going to cooperate, am I going to do the right 
thing and help out? Or am I going to make a mess of things for myself? Am I 
going to do the right thing here, or am I going to disappoint my parents and 
possibly ruin my life? This doesn’t have to be the worst day of your life-but if 
I can’t get you to talk to me, well who knows?  
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Andrew: But what should I do? 
 
Officer: People make mistakes, Andrew. Everybody makes mistakes. And there’s no 
crime in saying, “you know what?  I made a mistake and I’m sorry.”  I mean 
things happen. Maybe you got involved in this because your parents don't pay 
enough attention to you. Take it from me, I know where you’re coming from. 
I’ve been there. You’re not a violent guy, but you were fed up! You had to 
take action. Look Andrew, when kids try to outsmart the police, try to cover 
up something they did-it usually doesn’t work out too well for them.  The 
bottom line is I’d hate to think this is the end of the road for you. Now I’m 
going to leave for few minutes so you can think about these things. But I need 
you to really think about what you are going to do.  
 
 (Narrator FREEZES the play) 
 
Narrator: Let’s stop for a minute. (To the audience) First, what’s going on here? 
(Discussion)  
 
(Slide 5: Recap) 
 
Narrator: Some of the things we just watched are events that might occur when 
police officers question suspects about a crime.  Why don’t we review the 
important points.  (1) On February 17th, Jeff Murphy was robbed in LOCAL 
Park. (2) Andrew is a suspect in this crime (that means that Detective Smith 
thinks that Andrew is involved in the crime). (3) Andrew is being interrogated 
(or questioned) by Det. Smith about the crime. Is everybody clear? 
 
(Slide 6: Blank Slide) 
 
 Okay, why don’t we check in with Andrew. (Narrator UNFREEZES suspect) 
Andrew, looks like you’re in some trouble here. What are you going to do? 
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Andrew: (scared and anxious) I don’t know. I feel like I need to tell him something, 
or else I’m going to straight to jail. I feel like I don’t have any options.  
 
Narrator: (to the audience) Does Andrew have any options?  What are Andrew’s 
options? (Discussion with the audience).  
 
Narrator: Andrew, do you mind if I take a look at the card you’re holding? 
 
(Andrew hands the narrator the card. It is a Miranda rights waiver form. The 
narrator reads the Miranda rights aloud to the audience). 
 
(1)You have the right to remain silent. 
 
(2)Anything you say can be used against you in court 
 
(3)You have a right to talk to a lawyer before we ask you any questions and to have 
him  or her with you during questioning. 
 
(4)If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed for you before questioning if 
you wish. 
 
(5) If you decide to answer questions now without a lawyer present, you still have the 
right to stop questioning at any time until you talk to a lawyer.  
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Narrator: (to audience) What are these called? (Discussion: Students should 
recognize these rights as the Miranda rights.  Allow students to discuss how they are 
familiar with the Miranda rights).  
 
(Slide 7: The Miranda Rights) 
 
Didactic # 1: “These Are Your Miranda Rights”/Explanation of the Miranda 
Rights 
 These are your Miranda Rights sometimes called the Miranda Warning. The 
Miranda rights are named after an important Supreme Court Case in which the Court 
that police officers should be required to inform suspects that they have certain rights 
before questioning them about the crime.  You’ve probably heard police officers read 
these to suspects on television shows and movies. If the police take you into custody, 
you have certain rights, like the right to remain silent and the right to an attorney. 
Before the police ask any questions about the crime, they usually read you the 
Miranda rights and will give you a piece of paper or a card with your rights written 
on them.  
 
Andrew, in order for you to make a decision about what you might do in this 
situation, it’s important that you are VERY clear about what these rights mean. So tell 
me, what does “you have the right to remain silent mean?” 
 
Andrew: I think it means, “If I’m innocent, I don’t have to talk.” 
  
Narrator: (To the audience) Is that what the right to remain silent means? 
(Discussion) 
(Narrator goes through the explanation slides) 
 
You might find this surprising, but a lot of people, including adults, are not sure about 
what these rights actually mean. So let’s go through some definitions.  
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(Slide 8: The Miranda Rights - You have the right to remain silent) 
 
1. You have the right to remain silent.  
This means you can choose not to answer any questions the police ask you 
about the crime. No one can force you talk about the crime, not the police, not 
the judge, not your parents-you can choose to keep quiet.  
 
(Slide 9: The Miranda Rights - Anything you say can be used 
against you in court.) 
 
2. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law.  
Consider this to be a warning about something that could happen later in 
court. The police can use what you say to them during questioning as evidence 
that will help a judge or jury decide if you are guilty.  
 
(Slide 10: The Miranda Rights - Anything you say can be used 
against you in court. con't) 
 
Remember the police can use anything you say to them during questioning even if 
you cooperate with them and even if they tell you they won’t.  
 
(Slide 11: The Miranda Rights - You have the right to talk to a 
lawyer) 
 
3. You have a right to talk to a lawyer before we ask you any questions and 
to have him or her with you during questioning.  
This means that you can have an attorney with you while the police are 
questioning you. Sometimes the police may refer to an attorney as a lawyer, 
legal counsel, or public defender. Attorney, lawyer, legal counsel, and public 
defender are four words that mean the same thing: someone who is an expert 
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in the law who helps people like you and me when we get into legal trouble—
it is someone who helps us with the police and in court, whether we are 
innocent or guilty of the crime we are accused of.   
 
(Slide 12: The Miranda Rights - If you cannot afford a lawyer…) 
 
4. If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed to represent 
you before questioning if you wish.  
 
This means that the court will give you a lawyer for free if you do not have 
money to pay for one.  
 
(Slide 13: The Miranda Rights: If you cannot afford a lawyer 
con't) 
 
Even kids who have no money at all or whose parents cannot afford lawyers 
can have a lawyer for free.  
 
(Slide 14: The Miranda Rights: If you decide to answer 
questions now…) 
 
5. If you decide to answer questions now without a lawyer present, you still 
have the right to stop questioning at any time until you talk to a lawyer.  
This means that if you start talking to the police about the crime or about 
anything else, you can stop talking at any time and tell the police you want to 
talk to a lawyer.  
 
(Slide 15: You have choices) 
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Narrator: So believe it or not Andrew, you do have options here. You don’t have to 
talk to the police about the crime. You can ask for a lawyer to help you out. 
And finally, even if you start talking about the crime-you can stop talking at 
any time and ask for a lawyer. 
 
Andrew: Yea, but he’s a police officer, can’t he take these rights away? I mean I’m 
stuck in a police station-- if he tells me that I need to talk about a crime, don’t I have 
to do it?   
 
Narrator: (to audience) That’s a good question. If the police officer tells Andrew he 
has to talk about the crime, does he have to do it?  Can the police officer 
decide to take Andrew’s rights away? Does anyone have the ability to take 
Andrew’s rights away? (Discussion) 
 
(Slide 16: Rights are Guaranteed) 
 
Didactic # 2: Miranda Rights Are Based on Constitutional Amendments 
 Even though police officers read you these rights, these rights do not come 
from the police; the police officers do not give you these rights, and can they take 
them away.   
  
(Slide 17: Rights are Guaranteed con't) 
 
The decision about whether or not to exercise, or use, these rights is in your 
hands. By definition, rights are guaranteed. This means that you can decide not to use 
them, but no one- not the police, not the judge, not your parents, no one - can take 
them away from you.  
 
(Slide 18: Rights are universal) 
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No one can tell you not to use your rights. No one can make you talk to the 
police. It doesn’t matter if you are guilty or innocent, a child or an adult, these rights 
are yours -- the decision to use or not to use them is always in your hands-that’s what 
having a right means.  
 
Andrew: But if these rights do not come from the police, where do they come from? 
 
(Slide 19:  “Constitution” slide. Allow for audio.) 
 
Narrator: The right to remain silent when police are questioning you about a crime 
and the right to have an attorney to help you out when you get into trouble are 
your Constitutional rights.  
 
(Slide 20: Your Constitutional Rights)  
 
Specifically, the Miranda rights are based on the 5th and 6th amendments from 
the Bill of Rights. The 5th amendment protects people accused of crimes from 
self-incrimination, or being forced by the police or judge to say things that 
will get you in trouble. The 6th amendment says that people who have been 
accused of crimes can have a lawyer, their own personal legal expert, who can 
help them out during questioning or in court. These amendments prevent the 
government from unfairly accusing people of crimes and unfairly putting them 
in jail-but we’ll talk more about that later.   
 
So Andrew, the right to silence and the right to an attorney actually come from two of 
the most important documents in this nation’s history, the Constitution and the Bill of 
Rights.  
   
(Slide 21: Blank Slide) 
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Andrew: Okay, so these rights are my Constitutional rights and no one can take them 
away from me. But, I’m still not sure that using my rights in this situation is 
my best option. I mean the police officer said that two witnesses saw me in 
LOCAL Park around that time. Given that they have that kind of evidence-
shouldn’t I make things easier for myself and talk to the police about the 
crime? I mean, he said he’s trying to help me. Shouldn’t I let him? Shouldn’t I 
tell him what he wants to hear to make it easier on myself? Wouldn’t that be 
in my best interest? 
 
Narrator: (to audience) Is the police officer trying to help Andrew out in this 
situation? Is that the police officer’s goal in this situation? Is that the police 
officer’s job? Do you think Andrew should talk to the police about the crime 
in order to make things easier for himself? What do you think? (Discussion)  
 
Didactic #3: Police Officer’s Role/Purpose of Interrogation/Purpose of 
Confessions 
Narrator:  I think it comes down to understanding why Detective Smith wants to ask 
Andrew these questions. Why don’t we ask the Detective Smith what his role 
is, what his job is? (Narrator UNFREEZES the police officer). Detective 
Smith, we were hoping you could tell us what your goal in this situation is. 
 
Officer: My job in this situation is to … (Looks at Andrew and stops himself. Then to 
the narrator), wait a minute, can you get him to FREEZE, I don’t want him 
hearing this (Narrator FREEZES suspect). When we question someone we 
think is involved in a crime, we ask that suspect what he or she knows about 
the crime. If we have good reason to believe that a suspect is involved in a 
crime, our goal when we question him is to get the suspect to say he was 
involved, to confess.  
 
Narrator: Why do you want the suspect to confess? 
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Officer: Because the suspect’s confession is a piece of evidence that can be used to 
convince the judge or jury that the suspect is guilty of the crime. Lots of types 
of evidence-fingerprints at the crime scene, witness reports, DNA - can be 
used to convict suspects of the crime. But confessions - when suspects say 
they were involved in the crime - are very powerful pieces of evidence. If you 
were serving on a jury, would you ever think that someone would falsely 
confess to a crime?  Isn’t it hard to imagine someone saying they committed a 
crime when they didn’t?  Because that’s so hard to imagine, a confession is 
the most convincing piece of evidence that exists.  When judges and juries 
hear that a suspect confessed to the police about a crime, the suspect is usually 
found guilty of the crime. 
 
Narrator: So confessions are important and getting the suspect to confess is 
important? 
 
Officer: Very important. I mean, it’s my job to keep criminals off the streets, to 
protect the people of this community. Therefore, when I question a suspect 
whom I have good reason to think committed the crime, I need to do 
everything in my power to get the suspect to confess, or say he did it. 
 
Narrator: Everything in your power? 
 
Officer: Everything within the limits of the law. 
 
Narrator: Like what? 
 
(Slide 22: Police Questioning Do's and Don'ts) 
 
Officer: Well, first I might try to convince the suspect that confessing to the crime is 
no big deal. Like I might act really laid back when I’m questioning the suspect 
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and say something like, “Listen, you’re tired. I’m tired. Why don’t you just 
help us both out and tell me what happened so we can get on with this.” 
 
Narrator: But a confession is a big deal? 
 
Officer: Oh, it’s a huge deal-again confessions are the most convincing piece of 
evidence that judges and juries can use to decide that a person is guilty. 
 
Narrator: What else might you do?  
 
(Slide 22: Police Questioning Do's and Don'ts - Next point) 
 
Officer: Do you mind if I use that for a minute? Well, I might imply things that are 
not completely true. I might go so far as to give the suspect the idea that I 
have evidence against him that I don’t actually have. For example, let’s say 
that we are also questioning the suspect’s friend about the crime. I might tell 
the suspect that his friend is sharing some really important information when 
the friend really hasn’t said much at all. I might tell the suspect that we found 
his fingerprints at the crime scene even though we haven’t. I also might say 
something that would make the suspect think we’re about to uncover some 
really big evidence against him-like I might say to the suspect, “We’ve got 
police officers on the scene, combing the area for DNA evidence -  is there 
any reason we might find your hair at the crime site?”  
 
Narrator: Anything else you might do? 
 
(Slide 22: Police Questioning Do's and Don'ts - Next point) 
 
Officer: Well, I might try to convince the suspect that confessing to the crime is the 
right thing to do. Like I might say to the suspect, “Listen, I know you’re under 
a lot of pressure. If you just come out and say that you were part of this, I 
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think you’re going to feel a lot of relief.” I might go so far as to make the 
suspect feel that, by not talking about the crime, he’s being uncooperative. 
Kind of like what I did with Andrew. Like I might say, “I really need you 
cooperate and tell me the truth about what you were doing on the night of the 
crime.” 
  
Narrator: Is there anything that you can’t do when you’re questioning a suspect? 
 
(Slide 22: Police Questioning Do's and Don'ts - Next point) 
 
Officer: Sure. I can’t use physical force against a suspect, like I can’t hit, or kick, or 
punch a suspect to make him or her talk about the crime. I also can’t threaten 
to use physical force, like I can’t say to the suspect, “If you don’t confess to 
the crime, I’ll beat you up.”  
 
(Slide 22: Police Questioning Do's and Don'ts - Last point) 
 
Also, I can’t continue to ask the suspect questions once he has asked for a 
lawyer.  I also can’t stop the suspect from calling a lawyer once he’s asked for 
one. 
I mean it’s important for me to do my job right, which means I would never 
physically harm or threaten a suspect to get a confession. I would also never 
continue to question a suspect once they asked for a lawyer.  
 
(Narrator FREEZEs the police officer) 
 
(Slide 23: Police Questioning Recap Slide) 
 
Narrator: (to audience) So, we just learned a few things. We learned that the job of 
the police is to protect the public, to keep criminals off the streets. Part of this 
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job involves questioning suspects. We also learned that confessions are very 
important pieces of evidence-like fingerprints or blood found at the crime 
scene-that can be used to help convince judges and juries that the suspect is 
guilty of the crime. So, if the police officer has good reason to think that the 
suspect is involved in the crime, he will try to get the suspect to confess to the 
crime during questioning.  Finally, we learned that police officers are allowed 
to tell the suspect information that may not be completely true during 
questioning. For instance, the police officer can suggest that the police have 
evidence against the suspect that they may not actually have-like the suspect’s 
fingerprints at the crime scene.  
 
 Did anything we just learned surprise you? (Discussion). Do you think this 
information is important for Andrew to know? (Discussion). Why? 
(Discussion). Okay, when I unfreeze him, you need to tell him this 
information and why you think this may be important for him to know. 
  
(Narrator selects an audience member to tell Andrew the important information. 
Narrator unfreezes suspect. Audience member reports the important information to 
Andrew.) 
 
Narrator: Andrew, given what you’ve just been told, do you think that Detective 
Smith is concerned with helping you out? Do you think he has your best 
interests in mind? 
 
Andrew: Probably not. If he thinks that I am somehow involved in this crime, he 
probably wants to get me to confess. He wants to use the information I tell 
him to convince the judge or jury that I’m guilty.  
 
Narrator: So, what do you think you’re going to do? 
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Andrew: I’m still not sure. I mean, if I refuse to talk won’t I look guilty? Won’t that 
look pretty bad to a judge or jury? I mean I feel like if I don’t say anything, 
it’s going to make me look like I have something to hide.  
 
Narrator: That’s a good question. (To the audience) Will Andrew look guilty if he 
refuses to talk? (Discussion). Can not talking to the police be used against 
Andrew in court? (Discussion)  
 
Didactic # 4: “Be Proud to Assert Your Rights”/ “Imagine Living in a Country 
Where You Did Not Have These Rights” 
 
(Slide 24: Be Proud to Assert Your Rights)  
  
 Refusing to answer questions about the crime or asking to speak with a lawyer 
cannot be used against you in court.  
 The bottom line is that you shouldn’t feel guilty about asserting your rights at 
all.  In fact, you should feel proud to assert these rights because having these rights 
sets the United States apart from other countries.   
 
(Slide 25: Constitutional Congress) 
 
When the founding fathers got together in 1776 to write the Constitution, they 
wanted to create a legal system that was different from any other legal system in the 
world.   
Benjamin Franklin (Slide 26), 
James Madison (Slide 27), 
George Washington (Slide 28), 
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realized that by guaranteeing rights to people accused of crimes, they were 
actually protecting all suspects regardless of whether they were innocent or guilty.  
(Slide 29 Creating an Equal Playing Field) 
You see these rights make sure that the government plays fair. They can’t 
threaten to beat you up to make you confess to some crime. They can’t throw you into 
a court room by yourself without anyone there to defend you. They can’t refuse to let 
you call a lawyer until you confess.  
Imagine that you lived in a country where people accused of crimes did not 
have these rights. What would happen? What might the police be able to do to 
suspects during questioning? (Discussion) If the police were allowed to do these 
things, do you think that we could be sure that these confessions were truthful? Why 
or why not? (Discussion) What purpose do these rights serve? (Discussion). How do 
these rights protect guilty people? Innocent people? 
 
Andrew: Okay. I think I get it. These rights are extremely important-they’re actually 
there to protect suspects, both innocent and guilty.  I mean I guess if criminal 
suspects didn’t have certain rights-if the government could do whatever they 
wanted to suspects-hit them, beat them up to get you to talk, how could we 
ever be sure that what a suspect said during police questioning was true? I get 
it. 
  
But this is a stressful situation and I just want it to be over with. What should I 
do? 
 
 
 
Narrator: You’re right, Andrew. Like we said earlier, interrogations are stressful. 
Suspects who are being questioned by the police may feel scared and stressed out.  
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Some things you might do during a police interrogation, may make the situation 
worse, some things may make the situation better. Why don’t we go over the Do’s 
and Don’t’s for  handling the stress of a police interrogation.  
(Slide 30: How to deal with the stress of an interrogation - Don'ts) 
Don’ts 
(1) Try to outsmart the police. It’s not a good idea to make up stories or lie to the 
police. This can get you into more trouble later in court.  
 
(2) Don’t mouth off to the police or be rude. This may irritate the police officer 
and make the situation even more stressful. 
 
(3) Don’t decide to just tell the police what you think they want to hear. Some 
suspects think believe that if they talk about the crime to the police, the judge will 
go easier on them in court. But this is almost never the case. In fact, just the 
opposite is true: Talking about the crime can only add to the evidence they are 
using to build a case against you in court. 
 
Suspects in a police interrogation may feel pressure to talk about the crime, so 
much pressure in fact that even innocent suspects sometimes believe that the best 
thing for them to do is to talk about the crime and admit to something they didn’t 
do. They may think that they can end an interrogation and go home by saying 
something about the crime. They may feel that they’ll be able to take back 
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anything they say during the interrogation later in court. But this simply isn’t true. 
Remember confessions are very convincing pieces of evidence. Once you’ve said 
something about the crime, it will be really hard to take it back. 
 
 (Slide 31: How to deal with the stress of an interrogation - Do's) 
 
The good news is that there are some things you can do to help you deal with the 
stress.  
 
Do 
(1) Be polite. Be courteous and respectful to the police officers.  
 
(2) Tell the police that you want to speak with a lawyer. 
 
a. Once you tell the police that you would like to speak to a lawyer, the 
police have to stop asking you questions until your lawyer arrives. 
(Slide 32: Interrogations are Stressful) 
  
Like we said, interrogations are stressful situations. 
 
(Slide 33: Scream slide - allow for audio) 
 
(Slide 34: How to deal with the stress of interrogation…Con't) 
(Slide 35: How to deal with the stress of interrogation…boxer 
picture)  
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(Slide 36: How to deal with the stress of interrogation…last piece) 
You may want someone there who’s on your side to help you figure stuff out-
someone who will fight for you in court- that’s the lawyer’s job. 
 
The legal system is complicated-you need an expert on your side to help explain 
things to you and help you make good decisions. Think of a lawyer as your own 
“personal expert” to the legal system.   
 
(Slide 37: Blank Slide) 
  
Andrew: Okay, so I realize there may be some good reasons to tell the police I would 
like to speak to a lawyer.  But I’ve already answered some of Detective 
Smith’s questions. Isn’t it too late to ask for a lawyer? 
 
Narrator: (To the audience) Is it too late for Andrew? Does anyone remember what 
the 5th Miranda right stated? (Discussion: Wait to see if anyone recalls the 5th 
Miranda right, “If you decide to answer questions now without a lawyer 
present, you still have the right to stop questioning at any time until you talk 
to a lawyer.” If students do not recall or cannot approximate the right, 
provide prompts.) 
 
Andrew: Okay, so I can still exercise my rights if I want to. But how should I assert 
my rights? 
 
Narrator: The easiest way to exercise your rights is to tell the police you want to 
speak to a lawyer. Use the “magic words.” Say, “I would like to speak to a 
lawyer.” Once you firmly and politely tell the police that you would like to 
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speak to a lawyer, the police have to stop asking you questions until your 
lawyer arrives.  
 
Andrew: So all I need to do is say, “I would like to speak to a lawyer?” 
 
Narrator: That’s all you need to do. Say it firmly and politely. “I would like to speak 
to a lawyer.” 
 
Andrew: I think I can do that… 
 
(Narrator UNFREEZES  police officer) 
 
Officer: Okay, Andrew. You’ve had some time to think about this. What’s it going to 
be, are you going to cooperate and tell me what happened?  
 
Andrew: (nervous) Well, should I have a lawyer? 
 
Narrator: (FREEZES the play. Then, to the audience), did Andrew just assert his 
rights? (Discussion) That’s right. In order to assert his rights, Andrew has to 
say, I want to speak to my lawyer. Asking a question like "Should I have a 
lawyer" or "Do I need I a lawyer" is not the same as politely telling the police 
that you would like to speak to a lawyer. Ok, let’s try this again.  
 
Officer: What’s it going to be Andrew? 
 
Andrew: I would like to speak to a lawyer. 
 
(Slide 38 “The End”) 
 
END PLAY 
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(Slide 39: Miranda Rights Interactive Assembly) 
 
Narrator: Thank you for participating in our play today. You’ve been a great 
audience.. We hoped that you learned a little about things that might happen 
during a police interrogation, about your Miranda rights and how to use them.  
 
 We are very interested to get some of your feedback about the assembly. At 
the beginning of the assembly, we passed out some index cards. Please take a minute 
to write down any questions or comments you might have, and we will collect them. 
Thank you again!  
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